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  INTRODUCTION   
The existence of war, variously defined, is the sine qua non 
condition for the lawful exercise of a wide range of statutory 
authorities that have supported the past decade of U.S. coun-
terterrorism operations worldwide. Some of these laws are rela-
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tively low profile in their operation. Civilians may be subject to 
the U.S. military justice system (rather than the civilian judi-
cial system) if “[i]n time of declared war or a contingency opera-
tion, [they are] persons serving with or accompanying an armed 
force in the field . . . .”1 Private security contractors implicated 
in misconduct are immune from tort suits for a wide swath of 
activities if performed “during time of war.”2 Other such stat-
utes are of greater political salience. Under the Military Com-
missions Act of 2009 (MCA), offenses are triable by military 
commission “only if the offense is committed in the context of 
and associated with hostilities.”3 The 2001 Authorization for 
Use of Military Force (AUMF),4 as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, authorizes the President to detain certain individuals 
“engaged in an armed conflict against the United States,” only 
“for the duration of these hostilities.”5 This AUMF “armed con-
flict” also remains one of the central domestic legal justifica-
tions for targeted killing operations by the United States 
abroad.6 
The question when such laws are triggered and for how 
long they remain in effect has rapidly become more than aca-
demic. The latest generation of military commission prosecu-
tions, for example, features some of the highest profile terrorist 
suspects, including several charged for their role in attacking 
the American warship USS Cole, an attack attributed to Al 
 
 1. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 2. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006)).  
 3. 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c). 
 4. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 
§ 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001); see also National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011). 
 5. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (emphasis added); see 
also id. at 520 (“It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that de-
tention may last no longer than active hostilities. See Article 118 of the Gene-
va Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, [1955] 6 U. S. T. 3316, 3406, T. I. A. S. No. 3364 [hereinafter Geneva III] 
(‘Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the 
cessation of active hostilities’).”); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010).  
 6. John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Coun-
terterrorism, Remarks at the Efficacy and Ethics of U.S. Counterterrorism 
Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the 
-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy (“In this armed conflict, in-
dividuals who are part of al-Qaida or its associated forces are legitimate mili-
tary targets. We have the authority to target them with lethal force just as we 
target enemy leaders in past conflicts, such as Germans and Japanese com-
manders during World War II.”). 
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Qaeda that killed seventeen U.S. service members in October 
2000.7 That attack took place before the events of September 
11, 2001, and before Congress passed the AUMF authorizing 
the use of military force against Al Qaeda. For purposes of es-
tablishing lawful military commission jurisdiction, was the 
United States already at war then?  
The issue arises equally at the end of war, as, for example, 
with the President’s announcement that the United States will 
conclude combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014.8 
Indeed, a growing collection of policy makers and security ex-
perts agree that the hostilities authorized by the AUMF more 
broadly will at some point have run their course.9 The 149 men 
still held at Guantanamo Bay are detained under the authority 
 
 7. Charge Sheet of Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad Al Nashiri, OF-
FICE OF MILITARY COMM’NS (Sept. 15, 2011), available at http://www.mc.mil/ 
Portals/0/pdfs/alNashiri2/Al%20Nashiri%20II%20(Referred%20Charges).pdf. 
 8. See¸ e.g., President Barack Obama, Address at the National Defense 
University (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter Obama NDU Speech], available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/transcript-of-obamas-speech 
-on-drone-policy.html (“Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organiza-
tions must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end.”); President Barack 
Obama, Remarks on the Drawdown of Troops in Afghanistan (June 22, 2011), 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-obama-afghanistan-troop 
-withdrawal-full-speech/story?id=13906420 (“After this initial reduction, our 
troops will continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan Security forces 
move into the lead. . . . By 2014, . . . the Afghan people will be responsible for 
their own security.”).  
 9. See, e.g., Karen DeYoung, Afghan War’s Approaching End Throws Le-
gal Status of Guantanamo Detainees into Doubt, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/afghan-wars 
-approaching-end-throws-legal-status-of-guantanamo-detainees-into-
doubt/2013/10/18/758be516-2d0a-11e3-97a3-ff2758228523_story.html; see also 
Counterterrorism Policies and Priorities: Addressing the Evolving Threat: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. 7 (2013) (state-
ment of Hon. Michael E. Leiter, Senior Counselor, Palantir Technologies); 
Robert M. Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda, 112 MICH. L. 
REV. 163 (2013); Elisabeth Bumiller, New Pentagon Chief Says Qaeda Defeat 
in Reach, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2011, at A11 (quoting then-Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta that the United States was “within reach of strategically defeat-
ing Al Qaeda”); Jeh Johnson, General Counsel, Defense Dep’t, Speech to Ox-
ford Union (Nov. 30, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/ 
11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-union (“[O]n the present course, there will 
come . . . a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of al 
Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured, and the group is no long-
er able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against the United States, such 
that al Qaeda as we know it, the organization that our Congress authorized 
the military to pursue in 2001, has been effectively destroyed.”); Obama NDU 
Speech, supra note 8.  
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of the AUMF.10 Do “hostilities” end when the United States 
leaves Afghanistan, such that the statutory authority for con-
tinued detention runs out? 
Notwithstanding the frequency of such war-related condi-
tions in key statutory authorities, legal scholars have largely 
assumed that the question of when war begins and ends is one 
the courts play little role in answering. Supreme Court deci-
sions like the World War II-era case Ludecke v. Watkins and 
the Civil War-era Prize Cases have been read to suggest that 
the existence of armed conflict is a political question, beyond 
the competence and the jurisdiction of the judiciary to answer.11 
If anything, the argument goes, contemporary courts are more 
apt to rely on the political question doctrine among threshold 
jurisdictional hurdles that preclude review of subjects from tar-
geting to rendition to torture.12 It should thus be unsurprising 
to conclude, as Stephen Vladeck puts it directly: “[W]hen the 
war has ended is a political question.”13  
But the non-justiciability of the question whether war ex-
ists for statutory purposes is far less certain than scholars have 
assumed. The political question assumption flows in part from 
a longstanding misreading of standard cases. Supreme Court 
decisions noting that the existence of war depends on a “politi-
cal act” (that is, something political actors do in the world) are 
regularly, and wrongly, taken to stand for the distinct notion 
that war’s existence is a “political question” (that is, something 
 
 10. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding 
that the AUMF authorizes Guantánamo detention); The Guantánamo Docket, 
N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last visited October 17, 
2014).  
 11. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow: The Dis-
turbing Prospect of War Without End, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 53, 86 
(2006) (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); The Prize Cases, 67 
U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863)); see also Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 874 (characterizing 
end of hostilities as a political question).  
 12. See, e.g., Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Bor-
ders, 2 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 283 (2011) (citing Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010)).  
 13. Vladeck, supra note 11, at 94; see also, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack 
L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2084 (2005) (noting that “courts often defer to the Presi-
dent's determinations concerning the status of military conflicts.”). While po-
litical question doctrine has been subject to harsh scholarly criticism for dec-
ades, see, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 
128 (1992), it retains both scholarly and at least some doctrinal salience.   
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the courts lack jurisdiction to consider).14 More, the political 
question assumption tends to discount or ignore the varied 
lines of cases over decades in which courts have been called up-
on to decide, and have decided, whether a statutory condition of 
war, variously defined, continues to hold.15 More properly un-
derstood, the cases stand for the proposition that the existence 
of war is often justiciable, and that the answer to whether war 
exists depends centrally on the statutory reason why one is pos-
ing the question.16  
In the present context—in particular with respect to the 
war-based statutory triggers contained in the MCA and 
AUMF—the existence of hostilities may well be determined 
with reference to ordinary principles of statutory interpreta-
tion. As the Supreme Court recently clarified, the applicability 
of the political question doctrine depends principally on wheth-
er the issue for decision has been textually committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of government, and whether 
there are judicially manageable standards for resolving it.17 In 
neither statutory example examined here is it clear that the 
Constitution allocates sole power to another branch of govern-
ment. More, both the MCA and AUMF require that the exist-
ence of “hostilities” be determined with respect to a standard 
established by the international law of armed conflict—a body 
 
 14. See, e.g., Brief for the Defendant/Appellee, Al Nashiri v. MacDonald, 
No. 12-35475, 2012 WL 1642306 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Opposition to Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of Defend-
ant’s Motion To Dismiss, Al Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(No. 10-cv-1469); John M. Hagan, From the XYZ Affair to the War on Terror: 
The Justiciability of Time of War, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1327 (2004); 
Vladeck, supra note 11, at 94. 
 15. See, e.g., Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(finding that “time of war” within Federal Tort Claims Act exemption does not 
require express declaration of war, but applies when, as a result of deliberate 
decision by executive branch, U.S. armed forces engage in an organized series 
of hostile encounters on a significant scale with the military forces of another 
nation); United States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314, 325–32 (2d Cir. 1963) (deter-
mining when World War II ended for purposes of determining statutory sen-
tence applicable “in time of war”); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d 
874 (10th Cir. 1948) (interpreting terms of life insurance contract providing for 
a lower rate of payout if death occurred during “war”); see also United States 
v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 454–55 (D. Mass. 2008) (interpreting mean-
ing of “termination of hostilities” for purpose of tolling of statute of limitations 
under Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act). 
 16. See infra Part II.  
 17. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012).  
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of law that offers detailed, even manageable, guidance on how 
to identify whether hostilities exist.18 
Yet just as the detailed nature of the applicable law here 
helps ensure that the question of the existence of hostilities is 
susceptible of judicial resolution, it also demonstrates how pos-
sible it is that a court’s answer, independently reached, might 
differ from that of the executive branch. In the military com-
mission war crimes prosecution of Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Mu-
hammad Al Nashiri for his role in the bombing of the USS Cole, 
the prosecution has maintained that the United States was not 
only at war in October 2000, it has been since 1996.19 At the 
same time, the set of objective factors the relevant law de-
mands be considered—including not only the warring parties’ 
statements at the time, but also the factual evidence of war on 
the ground—make a more than colorable argument that war 
did not commence until the attacks of September 11, 2001.20 
Similarly, the President may wish to continue to detain some of 
the men held at Guantanamo after 2014 and thus maintain 
that hostilities continue. But it may by then be possible to 
make out a case that the “hostilities” authorized against Al 
Qaeda have come to an end (because, for example, hostilities 
are no longer sufficiently intense, or the core group Congress 
authorized the use of force against no longer exists).21 If a court 
reaches this conclusion, must it then insist upon the detainees’ 
release?  
The instinctive strangeness of the notion that a court 
might determine whether or not the United States is at war for 
any purpose is undoubtedly part of what animates the assump-
tion that war’s existence is a political question. If the Constitu-
tion’s promise of democratic governance means anything, then 
surely it means that the political branches should have funda-
mental control over whether we are or are not at war.22 More, 
what could a court possibly add to the executive’s own findings 
of the factual existence of war on the ground?  
 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. Government Response to Defense Motion To Dismiss Because The 
Convening Authority Exceeded His Power in Referring This Case to a Military 
Commission, United States v. Al Nashiri, No. AE 104 (Military Comm’n Sept. 
13, 2012). 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See Johnson, supra note 9.  
 22. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation 
of Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. 797 (2012).  
PEARLSTEIN_4fmt 11/6/2014 4:13 PM 
2014] LAW AT THE END OF WAR 149 
 
Such concerns have regularly been salient in understand-
ing the role of the courts in statutory interpretation.23 But they 
have been addressed less by the political question doctrine, and 
more by a range of interpretive practices commonly called judi-
cial deference. Informed by the same separation-of-powers pur-
poses underlying the political question doctrine—the mainte-
nance of democratic accountability, the promotion of 
governmental effectiveness, the protection of individual liber-
ty—judicial deference in principle enables courts to retain their 
formal role as independent checks on executive authority while 
still serving the functional goals of the separation of powers.24 
So long as the judicial branch retains enough power “to resist 
encroachments of the others,”25 courts may in this sense cede 
some of their interpretive authority under Article III without 
threatening the formal constitutional scheme.26  
To the extent judicial deference to the executive on ques-
tions of statutory interpretation serves these functional separa-
tion-of-powers interests, deference may play a useful role. But 
whether deference in fact advances separation-of-powers inter-
ests in construing the statutory existence-of-war conditions ex-
amined here is far from clear.27 As this Article shows, determin-
ing whether hostilities exist within the meaning of the MCA 
and AUMF involves various types of inquiries. Some demand, 
for example, predictive or policy judgment; others depend on 
publicly demonstrable facts of which the courts have long taken 
judicial notice. Executive expertise matters centrally for some 
of these judgments; others are the bread-and-butter of judicial 
work. The constitutional value of political accountability may 
likewise be sometimes served better by judicial assertiveness 
than passivity. If the authority Congress has granted does not 
clearly afford the President the power he seeks to assert, the 
Court may best promote democratic deliberation by saying so—
 
 23. See infra Part IV.  
 24. See, e.g., Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National 
Security Constitution, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1549 (2009) (discussing judicial and 
scholarly accounts of the purposes of the separation of powers).  
 25. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power 
in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 496–97 (1989) (arguing 
that Chevron poses a challenge to the separation of powers). 
 26. For a detailed discussion of this idea, see Deborah N. Pearlstein, After 
Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 783 (2011) (describing “dynamic equilibrium” theory of separation 
of powers).  
 27. See infra Part IV. 
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by applying canons of interpretation geared toward limiting ex-
cessively broad delegations of power, or by favoring interpreta-
tions that promote dialogue between the President and Con-
gress and tailoring remedies to afford the branches time for 
political clarification before taking irrevocable judicial action. 
Without foreclosing policy options, active judicial participation 
in statutory interpretation may create incentives for congres-
sional action that had previously been absent, making it harder 
for Congress to sit out of democratic debates in which the Con-
stitution expects it to engage. Given the context-dependent na-
ture of such interests, this Article contends that the degree of 
any deference accorded even in the war setting should depend 
on a determination whether deference in fact serves the Consti-
tution’s functional goals. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the rea-
sons why scholars have tended to assume that the existence of 
hostilities poses a non-justiciable political question, and argues 
that the relevant case law reveals how this categorical assump-
tion is misplaced. Part II explores how justiciability concerns 
might arise in the current examples of the MCA and AUMF, 
and concludes that they do not preclude judicial engagement in 
resolving the existence-of-hostilities questions at issue there. 
This part includes a detailed discussion of the applicability of 
the international law of armed conflict at the beginning and 
end of war. Part III then turns to the separation-of-powers in-
terests that animate the political question doctrine and related 
mechanisms of deference the courts employ for negotiating in-
ter-branch conflict. It considers how courts might approach ex-
istence-of-hostilities questions in this setting to attend to inter-
ests of expertise and accountability while fulfilling their Article 
III duties of judicial review.  
I.  WHEN WAR IS NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION   
Supreme Court decisions such as the Prize Cases and 
Ludecke v. Watkins,28 as well as a handful of Vietnam-era lower 
court decisions turning away constitutional challenges to the 
President’s use of force abroad,29 have led several scholars to 
 
 28. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 
Black) 635 (1863). 
 29. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1157 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding 
that the Vietnam war was “constitutionally authorized by the mutual partici-
pation of Congress and the President,” and that the judiciary lacked power to 
review such a determination); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1308–
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conclude that questions regarding the existence and nature of 
war are matters for the political branches.30 But the non-
justiciability of such questions for statutory purposes is far less 
certain. On the contrary, while the Court has often looked 
closely at statements and actions by the President and Con-
gress in interpreting statutes with war-related conditions, its 
examination has been in the service of an otherwise unremark-
able assertion of judicial authority to interpret the meaning of 
the law, sometimes in ways directly contrary to the asserted 
position of the executive. As the first section below demon-
strates, varied cases over decades have called on courts to de-
cide when a legal condition of war exists.31 In none of these cas-
es did the Court hold that the statute itself was beyond its 
jurisdiction to interpret. Moreover, as Section B explains, while 
the political question doctrine generally survives, its applica-
tion in the existence-of-hostilities context is far from clear. 
A. THE EXISTENCE OF HOSTILITIES CASES 
The Supreme Court began facing questions of war almost 
immediately after the country’s founding, beginning with the 
quasi-war in which French privateers attacked U.S. ships trad-
ing goods with Britain. In that conflict, the Court was called to 
decide who counted as an “enemy” within the meaning of a 
1799 federal statute, which provided for certain rights to sal-
vage for American ships “re-taken from the enemy.”32 Rejecting 
plaintiff’s argument that France could not really be considered 
an “enemy” under the statute, Bas v. Tingy made clear that, 
even in the absence of a declaration of war by Congress, the 
Court would interpret the law based on the world as the justic-
es themselves perceived it. As Justice Moore put it: 
[B]y what other word [can] the idea of the relative situation of Ameri-
ca and France . . . be communicated, than by that of hostility, or war? 
And how can the characters of the parties engaged in hostility or war 
be otherwise described than by the denomination of enemies? It is for 
 
09 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding that a challenge to the ongoing bombing in Cambo-
dia was a political question); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 
1967) (per curiam) (finding that the commander-in-chief’s decision to send 
troops to Vietnam was a non-justiciable political question). 
 30. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 11, at 94; see also, e.g., Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra note 13, at 2084 (“[C]ourts often defer to the President’s determi-
nations concerning the status of military conflicts.”).  
 31. See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1963); New York Life Ins. Co. v. 
Durham, 166 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1948). 
 32. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 37 (1800). 
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the honour and dignity of both nations, therefore, that they should be 
called enemies; for, it is by that description alone, that either could 
justify or excuse, the scene of bloodshed, depredation and confisca-
tion, which has unhappily occurred. . . . .33 
Justice Washington’s opinion examined the interpretive 
problem in greater detail, finding significance in the facts that 
Congress had by then raised an army, suspended intercourse 
with France, dissolved a treaty between the nations, and au-
thorized U.S. armed ships to attack France’s ships (and defend 
our own against armed attack) on the high seas.34 Neither Con-
gress’s failure to mention France in the statute by name, nor 
Congress’s refusal to call its separate authorization to use force 
against France a “war,” could overcome the reality that, in the 
Court’s view, “[i]n fact and in law we are at war.”35  
The Prize Cases, though most commonly cited in support of 
a broad reading of presidential power under Article II of the 
Constitution,36 in fact take a strikingly similar approach to re-
solving the existence-of-war question the cases presented. The 
Court there faced the question whether President Lincoln had a 
“right” to impose a naval blockade of southern ports following 
the Confederate attack on the federal base at Fort Sumter in 
1861.37 Notably, the key war-related question presented was 
not one of statutory interpretation, but of international law: 
whether war existed at the time the ships were captured such 
that the law of prize applied.38 That the Court was in the first 
instance concerned with the meaning of international law is 
made clear not only in its statement of the question (as to 
whether “the President [had] a right to institute a blockade of 
ports in possession of persons in armed rebellion against the 
Government, on the principles of international law”), but also 
in its answer (“the opinion that the President had a right, jure 
belli, to institute a blockade of ports in possession of the States 
in rebellion, which neutrals are bound to regard”).39 
 
 33. Id. at 39. 
 34. Id. at 41. 
 35. Id. at 42. 
 36. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee, The Civil War in U.S. Foreign Relations 
Law: A Dress Rehearsal for Modern Transformations, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53, 
68–70 (2008). 
 37. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 648 (1863). 
 38. Id. at 666. 
 39. Id. at 665, 671; see also id. at 674 (“[Enemy] is a technical phrase pe-
culiar to prize courts, and depends upon principles of public policy as distin-
guished from the common law.”); id. at 671 (“The objection made to this act of 
ratification [by Congress], that it is ex post facto, and therefore unconstitu-
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Rejecting the executive’s vigorous arguments urging judi-
cial abstention from any question regarding the President’s ac-
tions,40 the Court likewise rejected the notion that the existence 
of war within the meaning of international law required a con-
gressional declaration. A civil war, between a state and an in-
surgent group, was something whose existence the Court was 
bound to notice, whether the governments of the warring par-
ties had acknowledged or declared it legally or not.41 
A civil war is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its acci-
dents—the number, power, and organization of the persons who orig-
inate and carry it on. When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in 
a hostile manner a certain portion of territory; have declared their in-
dependence; have cast off their allegiance; have organized armies; 
have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world 
acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a war. . . . As a 
civil war is never publicly proclaimed, eo nomine against insurgents, 
its actual existence is a fact in our domestic history which the Court 
is bound to notice and to know [Petitioner] cannot ask a Court to af-
fect a technical ignorance of the existence of a war, which all the 
world acknowledges to be the greatest civil war known in the history 
of the human race.42  
Thus, “war may exist without a declaration on either side,” 
as it existed here, no matter what the warring governments 
might say.43  
 
tional and void, might possibly have some weight on the trial of an indictment 
in a criminal Court. But precedents from that source cannot be received as au-
thoritative in a tribunal administering public and international law.”). 
 40. Id. at 645 (“The counsel for the United States, speaking for the Presi-
dent . . . testifies, in well-considered rhetoric, his amazement that a judicial 
tribunal should be called upon to determine whether the political power was 
authorized to do what it has done.”). 
 41. For a version of this argument rejecting the reading of the Prize Cases 
as showing great deference to the President, see Deborah Pearlstein, Contem-
porary Lessons from the Age-Old Prize Cases: A Comment on the Civil War in 
U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 73, 79–81 (2008). 
 42. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 666–67, 669; see also Matthews v. 
McStea, 91 U.S. 7 (1875) (recognizing that war may exist whether or not de-
clared, and finding that “hostilities had commenced” and a state of war existed 
before presidential proclamation declaring blockade of South); The Neustra 
Senora de la Caridad, 17 U.S. 497, 502 (1819) (“War notoriously exists, and is 
recognized by our government to exist, between Spain and her colonies.” (em-
phasis added)).  
 43. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668 (citations omitted); see also id. at 
668–69 (“This greatest of civil wars was not gradually developed by popular 
commotion, tumultuous assemblies, or local unorganized insurrections. How-
ever long may have been its previous conception, it nevertheless sprung forth 
suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of war. The 
President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without wait-
ing for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to it by him or 
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Despite this pronouncement, much has been made of the 
opinion’s subsequent statement that the “Court must be gov-
erned by the decisions and acts of the political department of 
the Government” on the question of “what degree of force the 
crisis demands.” 44 Yet the Court in this passage was concerned 
not with its stated question presented—whether war existed for 
purposes of triggering the law of prize—but rather, separately, 
with whether the President had the authority under Article II 
of the Constitution to respond to the southern attack without 
first going to Congress.  
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander in-chief, 
in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile re-
sistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel 
him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is a question to be 
decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions and 
acts of the political department of the Government to which this pow-
er was entrusted. “He must determine what degree of force the crisis 
demands.” The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclu-
sive evidence to the Court that a state of war existed which demanded 
and authorized a recourse to such a measure, under the circumstanc-
es peculiar to the case.45 
Put differently, in the Court’s view, it was entirely up to 
the President to decide, having been attacked, whether or not 
to establish a blockade—in effect, whether or not to shoot 
back.46 That decision was indeed within the President’s consti-
tutional power. It was likewise a matter of executive discretion 
under then prevailing international law whether or not to af-
ford the opposing party “belligerent rights.”47 But once such po-
 
them could change the fact.” (second emphasis added)).  
 44. See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 62–63 (citing Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 
670); see also LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 6–7 (1995) (recount-
ing acceptance at constitutional convention of power “to repel sudden at-
tacks”). 
 45. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 670. 
 46. One might well question under contemporary international law 
whether the Court was right that the President is entitled to complete discre-
tion on the matter of what degree of force is appropriate in self-defense. See, 
e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”). 
 47. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 667 (“The laws of war, as established 
among nations, have their foundation in reason, and all tend to mitigate the 
cruelties and misery produced by the scourge of war. Hence the parties to a 
civil war usually concede to each other belligerent rights. They exchange pris-
oners, and adopt the other courtesies and rules common to public or national 
wars.”).  
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litical actions were taken,48 the Court would determine for itself 
whether war existed as a matter of law, no matter what Con-
gress or the President called it.  
This reading of the Prize Cases might be less persuasive 
were it not for the fact that the Court’s confidence in its ability 
to recognize the existence of war would lead it to the opposite 
result just a few years later. The Court rejected the 1864 mili-
tary trial of U.S. citizen Lamdin Milligan because there was no 
“actual war” in Indiana, despite the executive’s insistence that 
war existed such that military trial was justified.49 While per-
force acknowledging that the Civil War was actively ongoing at 
the time of Milligan’s arrest, the Court held that the state of 
Indiana, where the arrest occurred, was not part of it. 
The necessities of the service, during the late Rebellion, required that 
the loyal states should be placed within the limits of certain military 
districts and commanders appointed in them; and, it is urged, that 
this, in a military sense, constituted them the theatre of military op-
erations . . . . The conclusion does not follow from the premises. If ar-
mies were collected in Indiana, they were to be employed in another 
locality, where the laws were obstructed and the national authority 
disputed. On her soil there was no hostile foot; if once invaded, that 
invasion was at an end, and with it all pretext for martial law . . . . If, 
in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it 
is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on 
the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails, 
there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus 
overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no 
power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule 
until the laws can have their free course . . . . Martial rule can never 
exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed 
exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual 
war.50  
One might reasonably note that Milligan was decided in 
1866, the year after the war had ended, and that it was thus 
politically easier for the Court to reach the conclusion it did.51 
 
 48. The Court also noted that foreign sovereigns had reacted to the attack 
on Fort Sumter by declaring their neutrality. See id. at 669.  
 49. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 84–85 (1866) (reporting the government’s 
argument that “every specification upon which the petitioner was tried by the 
military commission” contained the averment that the relevant acts were 
committed in “a State within the military lines of the army of the United 
States, and the theatre of military operations, and which had been and was 
constantly threatened to be invaded by the enemy”).  
 50. Id. at 126–27 (third and fourth emphases added). 
 51. The Court itself hints as much. See id. at 109 (“During the late wicked 
Rebellion, the temper of the times did not allow that calmness in deliberation 
and discussion so necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial ques-
tion . . . . Now that the public safety is assured, this question, as well as all 
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Yet the passage of a mere ten months (from the end of shooting 
to the issuance of the decision in Milligan) should not obscure 
the remarkable sweep of the Court’s rejection of the govern-
ment’s argument. The record before the Court established that 
at the time of Milligan’s arrest, the state “was a military dis-
trict, was the theatre of military operations, had been actually 
invaded, and was constantly threatened with invasion.”52 As 
the concurring opinion pointed out, it also appeared that  
a powerful secret association, composed of citizens and others, existed 
within the state, under military organization, conspiring against the 
draft, and plotting insurrection, the liberation of the prisoners of war 
at various depots, the seizure of the state and national arsenals, 
armed cooperation with the enemy, and war against the national gov-
ernment.53 
Yet the Court nonetheless concluded that not only was a mili-
tary trial unnecessary under the circumstances, but also that 
the circumstances in Indiana did not amount to “actual war.”54  
The many other Civil War-era cases requiring the statuto-
ry construction of existence of hostilities provisions are indeed 
consistent with the reading that while political actions matter 
in the determination of war’s existence, which actions matter 
most depends upon the statute, and in all events is a question 
that may be determined by the Court.55 In 1869, United States 
v. Anderson required the Court to decide how to construe a 
statute giving property owners a cause of action in the Court of 
Claims for any proceeds from property abandoned or captured 
during the war—provided the claim was brought “within two 
years after the suppression of the rebellion.”56 In resolving the 
question when the rebellion was suppressed for purposes of the 
statute, the Court began by noting its expectation that the 
question of when the war ended would arise for any number of 
legal purposes. Disclaiming any suggestion that its opinion on 
the scope of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act (CAPA) 
 
others, can be discussed and decided without passion or the admixture of any 
element not required to form a legal judgment.”) (emphasis omitted).  
 52. Id. at 140 (Chase, C.J., concurring). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 127 (majority opinion). 
 55. See The Protector, 79 U.S. 700 (1871) (determining whether a writ of 
error was timely filed); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493 (1870) (construing a 
statute declaring that when an action accrues against a person “during exist-
ence of the present rebellion” the time during which they were unreachable 
would not be deemed part of “the time limited by law for the commencement of 
such an action”). 
 56. United States v. Anderson, 76 U.S. 56, 58 (1869) (quoting statute). 
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at issue should bear on any other potentially applicable laws, 
the Court looked carefully to Congress’s purpose in passing 
CAPA itself.57 Here, the Court reasoned, Congress was especial-
ly concerned to aid residents of the South who had remained 
loyal to the federal government during the conflict. Especially 
as to that population, “Congress did not intend to impose . . . 
the necessity of deciding [when the rebellion ended] for them-
selves.”58 Rejecting, then, the southern party’s suggestion that 
the rebellion ended upon the last surrender of a Confederate 
general (in May 1865), the Court instead concluded that it 
should prefer to look for clues to statutory meaning in pro-
nouncements of the federal government in fixing a date when 
the conflict ended. Since Congress had determined in separate 
legislation setting the pay of members of the union army that 
the rebellion closed on August 20, 1866, the Court reasoned 
that the later date should hold as well for CAPA, aimed at 
claimants “whose interests [Congress] equally desired to pro-
tect.”59  
Indeed, a number of contemporaneous statutes required 
similar inquiries into the beginning and/or ending date of the 
war, and while the Court sometimes addressed the matter with 
little or no analysis, in no case did it appear to contemplate de-
clining jurisdiction over the issue as the political question doc-
trine would require. In Stewart v. Kahn, for example, the Court 
was asked to decide whether a federal law passed near the end 
of the war in 1864 applied retroactively to provide for the war-
time-long tolling of state statutes of limitation barring late-filed 
civil suits.60 The federal law provided that statutes of limitation 
 
 57. Id. at 69 (“The point, therefore, for determination is, when, in the 
sense of this law, was the rebellion entirely suppressed . . . . [T]he purposes of 
this suit do not require us to discuss the question . . . whether the rebellion 
can be considered as suppressed for one purpose and not for another, nor any 
of the kindred questions arising out of it, and we therefore express no opinion 
on the subject.”) (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. at 70. 
 59. Id. at 71; see also McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 438 (1880) 
(construing a statute prohibiting dismissal of officers except by court martial 
“in time of peace,” finding “time of peace” determined by presidential procla-
mation of peace as subsequently recognized by separate act of Congress regu-
lating soldiers’ pay); Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187, 193 (1875) (finding prop-
erty in Georgia still in “hostile possession” and therefore subject to federal 
capture because “territory within the limits of the State of Georgia [was] occu-
pied by the national forces, and actually governed by means of that occupa-
tion”) (citing The Protector, 79 U.S. at 702). 
 60. Stewart, 78 U.S. at 505 (noting without discussion that Presidential 
proclamation established southern states were in rebellion as of April 1861).  
PEARLSTEIN_4fmt 11/6/2014 4:13 PM 
158 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:143 
 
be tolled during such time as a civil defendant (here, a Louisi-
ana debtor) was “beyond the reach of legal process.”61 Rejecting 
the argument that the statute was written to operate only pro-
spectively, the Court again looked to Congress’s particular pur-
pose in passing the law and insisted that Congress could not 
have intended a construction that would effectively deny relief 
to any northern claimant (here, a New York creditor) who had 
been unable to proceed against southern defendants through-
out the war. Instead, the Court looked on this occasion to presi-
dential proclamations of the existence of a southern rebellion to 
demonstrate the minimum time after which plaintiffs would 
have had no access to any Louisiana courts, and applied the 
statute retroactively to allow plaintiffs claim to proceed. 
The Protector, a more well-known but even shorter squib of 
a case from the era, likewise involved a dispute over how long a 
statute of limitations (governing the time for seeking appeal of 
federal judgments) should be tolled to exclude the time of the 
Civil War.62 Here, the Court did look squarely to the acts of the 
political branches—but not because it was discernibly con-
cerned with its own jurisdictional limitations. Rather, because 
in the Court’s own estimation “[a]cts of hostility by the insur-
gents occurred at periods so various, and of such different de-
grees of importance . . . that it would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to say on what precise day [the war] began or 
terminated,” it would be necessary “to refer to some public act 
of the political departments of the government to fix the 
dates.”63 In this regard, the Court found statements of the exec-
utive most convenient to employ because Congress was in re-
cess when hostilities began. Likewise, because the war began 
and ended at different times in different states (a finding the 
Court made entirely on its own, without reference to any 
statements or actions of the political branches), the executive’s 
proclamations declaring various ends of the war would be most 
helpful to use.  
Critically, the Protector Court cautioned, it was relying on 
presidential proclamations to set the end date of the war only 
“[i]n the absence of more certain criteria, of equally general ap-
plication.”64 When, in a later conflict, the executive’s own 
statements on the existence of war were unclear, the Court 
 
 61. Id. at 504. 
 62. The Protector, 79 U.S. at 701. 
 63. Id. at 702–03. 
 64. Id. at 702. 
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would take upon itself the task of “constru[ing]” what other ev-
idence might exist to determine, “for example . . . whether the 
situation is such that statutes designed to assure American 
neutrality have become operative.”65 And when more certain 
criteria were available—as happened, for example, thirty years 
later when the Court looked to the ratification of a peace treaty 
with Spain, rather than a presidential proclamation suspend-
ing hostilities—the Court would prove quite content to embrace 
them instead.66 
World War I brought with it a new set of war-dependent 
laws, and with them, a new set of court challenges surrounding 
their application. Yet while the Court occasionally interpreted 
these laws to authorize the continued exercise of power beyond 
the occurrence of events, such as the actual end of hostilities, 
which might intuitively be assumed to constitute the end of the 
war, the cases reflect no obvious hesitation by the Court to as-
sert its own interpretive power. They seem instead most easily 
read as classic exercises in employing the tools of statutory in-
terpretation—which tools led them in the particular cases to 
other indicia of war’s end.67 Consider Hamilton v. Kentucky Dis-
tilleries,68 concerning whether the War-Time Prohibition Act, 
passed ten days after the signing of the armistice with Germa-
ny on November 11, 1918, could be construed to continue pro-
hibiting the sale of distilled liquors a year later, when, accord-
ing to the statute, prohibition was for the limited purpose of 
“conserving the man power of the Nation, and to increase effi-
ciency in the production of arms” needed for the war effort.69 
The war effort was by now manifestly over, plaintiffs argued, 
and indeed, according to a series of statements by the President 
 
 65. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212–13 (1962) (citing The Three Friends, 
166 U.S. 1, 63, 66 (1897)). 
 66. J. Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315 (1904) (determining 
whether a merchant ship captured by the United States was lawfully subject 
to wartime capture) (“The President had not the power to terminate the war 
by treaty without the advice or consent of the Senate of the United States.”).  
 67. See Commercial Trust Co. of N.J. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923) (inter-
preting the Trading With the Enemy Act); Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 
(1921) (interpreting the legality of a court martial convicting petitioners of 
murder); Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries Warehouse Co., 251 U.S 146 (1919) (in-
terpreting the War-Time Prohibition Act).  
 68. Hamilton, 251 U.S at 146. 
 69. Id. at 153. 
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himself, the process of termination must now be understood as 
complete.70  
Rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that, in light of the statute’s 
purpose, the “conclusion of war” should be construed to mean 
simply the end of hostilities, the Court relied on the express 
terms of the statutory text, fixing the end of the statutory au-
thority as the statute provided, “until the conclusion of the pre-
sent war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, 
the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the 
President of the United States.”71 The event was thus to be 
fixed, the Court held, by “a phrase so definite as to leave no 
room for construction.”72 While the President had indeed spo-
ken publicly on many occasions about the end of the war, while 
the Treaty of Versailles had been concluded, while the Presi-
dent had even mentioned, in a veto message to Congress, the 
“demobilization of the army and navy,” such popular or passing 
references could not overcome the reality that the President 
had yet “refrained from issuing the proclamation declaring the 
termination of demobilization for which this act provides.”73  
It is not until 1923’s Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller that 
the Court first engaged directly, if briefly, the question of the 
judicial role in recognizing war’s end.74 Commercial Trust in-
volved the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), which 
provided that “[i]f the President shall so require, any money or 
other property . . . held . . . for the benefit of an enemy” be con-
veyed to an Alien Property Custodian, who would hold all 
rights in the property unless and until any disputes involving 
the legitimate ownership of the property required its return.75 
Plaintiffs had argued that because the Act should be under-
 
 70. Id. at 159 (citing presidential statements announcing, inter alia, the 
end of the war and discontinuation of various wartime agencies, and referenc-
ing a resumption of trade with Germany, the signing of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, and the demobilization of troops).  
 71. Id. at 153 (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. at 167. 
 73. Id. at 159–60; see also  Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1921) (cit-
ing related statutes in construing act providing that “no person shall be tried 
by court-martial for murder or rape committed within the geographical limits 
of the States of the Union and the District of Columbia in time of peace,” as 
meaning “peace in the complete sense, officially declared”); Hamilton, 251 U.S. 
at 168 (noting that “in fact demobilization had not terminated at the time” of 
the President’s veto message, or at the time the suit was brought, and, “for 
aught that appears, it has not yet terminated”).  
 74. 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923). 
 75. Id. at 53. 
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stood only as “a provision for the emergency of war,” its author-
ity should be construed to expire at the end of the war—an 
event marked by a joint resolution of Congress, and presiden-
tial proclamation, declaring the war against Germany at an 
end.76  
In the concluding paragraph of an otherwise terse opinion, 
the Court rejected plaintiffs’ suggestion that the legislation was 
no longer operative:  
[T]he power which declared the necessity is the power to declare its 
cessation, and what the cessation requires. The power is legislative. A 
court cannot estimate the effects of a great war and pronounce their 
termination at a particular moment of time, and that its consequenc-
es are so far swallowed up that legislation addressed to its emergency 
had ceased to have purpose or operation with the cessation of conflicts 
in the field.77  
It is perhaps unsurprising that such sweeping language 
would come to be invoked as a general rejection of the idea that 
the Court could properly play any role in establishing the dura-
tion of statutory authority for any statute whose operation de-
pended upon the existence of war, no matter what the statutory 
scheme provides. But such a reading would have the Commer-
cial Trust Court making a striking break with the many earlier 
cases in which it had looked to the law’s text and purpose in 
helping it to identify sources that could establish war’s begin-
ning or end—sources that included, variously, other acts of 
Congress, proclamations of the President, treaties, or the 
Court’s assessment of acts of hostilities themselves.78 Yet the 
Court gave no indication that it intended to embrace any such 
shift in view. On the other hand, what did distinguish this case 
from its predecessors was the breadth of the interpretive leap 
plaintiffs were asking the Court to take in declaring the custo-
dial authority of the act no longer in effect. Unlike the statute 
at issue in, for example, Hamilton, which provided that it was 
to be of limited duration (and indeed, expressly set the condi-
tion upon which its effectiveness would cease), TWEA con-
tained no such limits, either in the text of the statute, or by im-
plied reference to another body of law. Core provisions of 
TWEA were written with general regard to a “war” or an “ene-
my,” without reference to what the statute elsewhere called 
“the present war”;79 key provisions of TWEA indeed remain in 
 
 76. Id. at 57. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id.  
 79. The statute defined “enemy” as a subject of any nation with which the 
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effect today.80 Commercial Trust is thus better read for the 
proposition that, in the absence of any indication that the por-
tion of TWEA was meant to be limited to one war in particular, 
the Court would unremarkably understand the authority given 
by the Act as it understood any Act of Congress—as continuing 
in effect unless and until repealed.  
Subsequent World War I-era cases interpreting statutory 
conditions of war or emergency did nothing to support the view 
that Commercial Trust meant to turn away from the actively 
engaged role the Court had historically played. Rather, they did 
much to cement the notion that, as Justice Holmes put it for 
the Court the very next year: “[A] Court is not at liberty to shut 
its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law de-
pends upon the truth of what is declared . . . .”81 Thus, even 
when Congress had passed legislation declaring that the 
“emergency” necessary for the operation of its Washington, 
D.C. rent control statute remained in effect, the Court made 
clear that it would, for itself, “ascertain as it sees fit any fact 
that is merely a ground for laying down a rule of law.”82 Based 
on facts that were judicially noticeable, and findings that would 
have to be assessed by the trial court on remand, the Court left 
no uncertainty that it was prepared to hold the rent control 
statute no longer applicable because the war emergency—
updated congressional declaration notwithstanding—no longer 
existed as a matter of fact.83 
Whatever remaining significance might be attributed to 
the Commercial Trust dictum (and perhaps not much, as the 
case has been cited by the Court not at all in the past nearly fif-
ty years),84 the case rightly pales in significance to Ludecke v. 
Watkins for advocates of the argument that the existence of 
 
United States is “at war,” without reference to the particular war in which the 
United States was then engaged, implying the law would be effective, without 
additional action required, during any wartime period now or in the future. 
Commercial Trust, 262 U.S. at 52–53.  
 80. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1 (West 1917). 
 81. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547 (1924) (citing Block v. 
Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154 (1921)).  
 82. Id. at 548. 
 83. Id. at 547–48 (“A law depending upon the existence of an emergency 
or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergen-
cy ceases or the facts change even though valid when passed.”).  
 84. Indeed, the paradigmatic political question case, Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962), later makes clear this “cessation of hostilities” language from 
Commercial Trust was rather an overstatement. See infra Part I.B for a more 
detailed discussion of Baker. 
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war poses a political question.85 Decided three years after the 
United States publicly celebrated its victory in World War II, 
Ludecke called on the Court to interpret the Alien Enemy Act 
(AEA), first passed in 1798, providing for the deportation of 
foreign nationals from countries with which the United States 
is at war. By its terms, the AEA applies upon presidential proc-
lamation of a “declared war between the United States and any 
foreign nation or government, or [upon] any invasion or preda-
tory incursion . . . perpetrated, attempted, or threatened 
against the territory of the United States by any foreign nation 
or government . . . .”86  
Petitioner Kurt Ludecke, a German national ordered to be 
removed in 1946, challenged the Act’s applicability, arguing 
that whatever power Congress had intended to delegate the 
President in the AEA, that power did not “survive cessation of 
actual hostilities” following World War II.87 The Court rejected 
the argument, over dissents that focused their primary criti-
cism against the Act’s disturbing lack of provision for notice, 
hearing or judicial review. As for the effect of the war, the 
Court held, the power granted by the AEA “is a process which 
begins when war is declared but is not exhausted when the 
shooting stops.”88 It then added in a footnote, “when the life of a 
statute is defined by the existence of a war, Congress leaves the 
determination of when a war is concluded to the usual political 
agencies of the Government.”89 Where, as here, “[t]he political 
branch of the Government has not brought the war with Ger-
many to an end,” and indeed, the President had issued a proc-
lamation that “‘a state of war still exists,’” judges having “nei-
ther technical competence nor official responsibility” would not 
question the judgment that those deportable at the height of 
hostilities would still be deported “during the period of confu-
sion and conflict which is characteristic of a state of war even 
when the guns are silent but the peace of Peace has not come.”90 
It is not difficult to see why such language would lead some 
to conclude that Ludecke imposes sharp limits on the Court’s 
 
 85. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 11, at 77–78 (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 
335 U.S. 160, 167–70 (1948) (finding that a state of war continued following 
Germany's surrender in World War II)). 
 86. Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 161–62 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 21).  
 87. Id. at 166. 
 88. Id. at 167. 
 89. Id. at 169 n.13. 
 90. Id. at 170.  
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role in recognizing the end of a war. But it is important to un-
derstand what this language does not do. First and foremost, as 
the Court is elsewhere in its opinion at pains to point out, there 
is a difference between the position, which it takes, that the 
end of war depends, for purposes of the statute, on some kind of 
political act, and the view, which it avoids, that war’s existence 
vel non is a non-justiciable political question.  
‘The state of war’ may be terminated by treaty or legislation or Presi-
dential proclamation. Whatever the mode, its termination is a politi-
cal act. Whether and when it would be open to this Court to find that 
a war though merely formally kept alive had in fact ended, is a ques-
tion too fraught with gravity even to be adequately formulated when 
not compelled.91 
The question was not compelled in Ludecke. A self-
described Nazi, Mr. Ludecke had been arrested in the United 
States on December 8, 1941, and detained throughout the 
lengthy administrative process that ultimately resulted in a fi-
nal order of removal by the Attorney General in January 
1946.92 The Court’s passing statement about its own incompe-
tence in such matters came only after it had conducted a fairly 
pedestrian exercise in statutory interpretation, rejecting 
Ludecke’s “reading of the statutory phrase ‘declared war’ to 
mean ‘state of actual hostilities,’” and instead reading the stat-
ute to require an inquiry into what had actually been de-
clared.93 Among other factors persuading the Court that its 
reading of the statute was right, Ludecke’s proposal that the 
power to deport under the Act “did not survive cessation of ac-
tual hostilities” would “effect[ively] nullif[y] the power to deport 
alien enemies, for such deportations are hardly practicable dur-
ing the pendency of what is colloquially known as the shooting 
war.”94  
Further testing the Court’s insistence upon its own incom-
petence, its passing modesty came only after it devoted a 
lengthy set of paragraphs to analyzing in detail the factual and 
political state of affairs surrounding Ludecke’s final order of 
removal in 1948: the country still had “armies abroad exercis-
ing our war power,” no treaty of peace had been concluded with 
our enemies, the President had issued a proclamation providing 
that, while hostilities had ended, “a state of war still exists,” 
the President had recently addressed Congress recommending 
 
 91. Id. at 168–69 (citation omitted). 
 92. Id. at 162–63. 
 93. Id. at 166 n.11. 
 94. Id. at 166. 
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the reenactment of selective service legislation (among other 
things), and had even more recently issued an executive order 
asserting his authority “in time of war” to assume control of 
transportation systems.95 Such a fact-intensive analysis is not 
what one would expect of a case concluding the matter of war 
was nonjusticiable; it is rather the analysis one finds in a case, 
as in Ludecke, in which the Court asserts its jurisdiction and 
interprets and applies a statute for itself. Much in the same 
way the Court did four years later when, in interpreting the 
1951 Joint Resolution of Congress providing that the “state of 
war declared to exist between the United States and the Gov-
ernment of Germany . . . is hereby terminated,” German citi-
zens subject to removal under the Alien Enemy Act could no 
longer be removed.96 
If there were any doubt of the lasting impact of Ludecke’s 
dictum on judicial competence on these questions, the military 
justice cases of the era—involving laws tying the authority of 
various military trial regimes to the existence of war, decided 
both before and after Ludecke—make clear the Court’s deter-
mination to treat end-of-war authority triggers as standard 
questions of statutory interpretation. In re Yamashita, for in-
stance, involved a challenge to the legality of a U.S. military 
commission trial of a Japanese general following the end of 
hostilities between the United States and Japan.97 Among the 
questions presented was whether the executive’s authority to 
conduct the commission trial continued after the cessation of 
hostilities. In reaching its answer, the Court looked first to the 
statutory Articles of War that it read as authorizing military 
commissions.98 But both Article 15 of the statute, and the rele-
vant international law of the time, were silent on the question 
 
 95. Id. at 169–71 (citations omitted). 
 96. United States ex rel. Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347, 348 n.2 (1952) 
(per curiam); see also U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 540 n.1 
(1950) (holding that special procedures for the exclusion of aliens applicable 
“[w]hen the United States is at war or during the existence of the national 
emergency proclaimed by the President on May 27, 1941” continued to apply 
in 1948 in light of a 1947 presidential proclamation declaring the national 
emergency continues to exist); Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 
331 U.S. 111, 115–16 (1947) (rejecting a construction of the War Powers Act 
provision providing for the expiration of certain powers six months after “the 
termination of the war” as synonymous with the termination of “hostilities”).  
 97. 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
 98. Id. at 7. But cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding 
that 10 U.S.C. § 821 grants no authority for military commission trials where 
trials fail to comply with the law of nations).  
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of the duration of the authority to conduct such trials.99 As the 
Court put it: “We cannot say that there is no authority to con-
vene a commission after hostilities have ended to try violations 
of the law of war committed before their cessation, at least un-
til peace has been officially recognized by treaty or proclama-
tion of the political branch of the Government.”100 In the ab-
sence of any limit in federal or international law on the 
President’s Article 15 authority to conduct military trials, the 
power to prosecute violations of the law of war would be under-
stood, as with all prosecutions, to remain at the discretion of 
the prosecutor/executive.  
Perhaps most important, the corollary proposition would 
again prove true: a war-based condition in a statute or in a rel-
evant treaty could be interpreted to constrain the power grant-
ed—even in the face of executive branch opposition. This was 
the Court’s conclusion a decade later in Lee v. Madigan,101 a 
case involving the scope of the statutory power to try American 
soldiers before courts martial. U.S. soldier John Lee was tried 
by court martial for his involvement in a murder committed at 
Camp Cooke, California in June 1949. Article of War 92 (the 
statute applicable before the adoption of the modern Uniform 
Code of Military Justice) provided “that no person shall be tried 
by court-martial for murder or rape committed within the geo-
graphical limits of [the United States] in time of peace.”102 Re-
calling that “the Nation may be ‘at war’ for one [statutory] pur-
pose, and ‘at peace’ for another,”103 the Court construed “time of 
peace” for court martial purposes to preclude the court martial 
of a soldier accused of conspiring to commit murder at his Army 
base in June 1949. Applying a canon of constitutional avoid-
 
 99. Articles of War, ch. 2, § 2c, 41 Stat. 790 (1920). As of 1916, Article 15 
provided that any provisions “conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall 
not be construed as depriving military commissions . . . or other military tri-
bunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by 
statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions . . . 
or other military tribunals.” The Court also noted that it could find no authori-
ty for or against such trials in international law, and no prohibition on post-
war trials for war crimes committed during the war. 
 100. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 12. Indeed, the Court reasoned, it 
seemed practically impossible to conduct such a trial while active hostilities 
were still underway. 
 101. 358 U.S. 228 (1959) (holding that terms such as war and peace “must 
be construed in light of the precise facts of each case and the impact of the 
particular statute involved”). 
 102. Id. at 228 (emphasis added). 
 103. Id. at 231. 
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ance to favor a narrow construction of statutes permitting mili-
tary trial in particular, the Court rejected the executive’s ar-
guments otherwise.104  
The rule that emerges from these cases—that the existence 
of “war” depends on the legal context in which it arises, and 
that context and meaning are generally susceptible to judicial 
identification—has guided the courts through multiple subse-
quent conflicts in which the nature of available criminal sanc-
tions has regularly depended on the existence or absence of 
“war.”105  It has likewise prevailed in judicial efforts to under-
stand the scope of U.S. sovereign immunity from tort suits, an 
immunity preserved under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 
for “[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the 
military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of 
war.”106 Here, too, the courts have applied “normal tools of our 
trade—reason and judgment” in statutory interpretation, find-
ing that, for example, U.S. military involvement in the Gulf 
during the Iran-Iraq war would count as “time of war” for 
FTCA purposes, as would any instance “when, as a result of a 
deliberate decision by the executive branch, United States 
armed forces engage in an organized series of hostile encoun-
ters on a significant scale with the military forces of another 
nation.”107 And the courts have engaged in similar inquiries in 
 
 104. Id. at 236 (“[W]e cannot readily assume that the earlier Congress used 
‘in time of peace’ in Article 92 to deny soldiers or civilians the benefit of jury 
trials for capital offenses four years after all hostilities had ceased. To hold 
otherwise would be to make substantial rights turn on a fiction. . . . The mean-
ing attributed to them is at war with common sense, destructive of civil rights, 
and unnecessary for realization of the balanced scheme promulgated by the 
Articles of War.”).  
 105. See also, e.g., Broussard v. Patton, 466 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1972) (hold-
ing that an airman’s desertion, occurring after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
but before general ground fighting in Vietnam, was “in time of war” within the 
UCMJ provision allowing for prosecution without regard to the otherwise ap-
plicable statute of limitation, stating “for purposes of [this statute], ‘time of 
war’ refers to de facto war and does not require a formal Congressional decla-
ration”); United States v. Anderson, 38 C.M.R. 386 (C.M.A. 1968) (determining 
that the Vietnam conflict counted as a “time of war” such that soldier could be 
prosecuted for absence without leave without regard to the otherwise applica-
ble statute of limitation); United States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(determining when World War II ended for purposes of setting the statutory 
sentence applicable “in time of war”). 
 106. 28 U.S.C. § 2680j (2012). 
 107. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992) (cert. denied, 
508 U.S. 960 (1993)); see also Minns v. United States, 974 F. Supp. 500 (D. 
Md. 1997) (finding that the Persian Gulf War was a “time of war” under the 
FTCA notwithstanding the lack of a formal declaration of war), aff’d, 155 F.3d 
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interpreting the applicability of the Wartime Suspension of 
Limitations Act (WSLA), the federal law suspending statutes of 
limitations otherwise applicable in federal fraud cases for so 
long as the United States is “at war.”108 As the federal court re-
cently tasked with sorting out fraud claims arising out of Bos-
ton’s “big dig” construction project explained, “not every shot 
fired or every armed skirmish is of sufficient magnitude to stop 
the running of the statute of limitations.” Accordingly, the 
court looked to legislative history, case law, historical practice, 
and “common sense” to identify a set of factors relevant to de-
termining whether the United States was “at war” for purposes 
of that Act. In that instance, the factors included:  
(1) [T]he extent of the authorization given by Congress to the Presi-
dent to act; (2) whether the conflict is deemed a ‘war’ under accepted 
definitions of the term and the rules of international law; (3) the size 
and scope of the conflict (including the cost of the related procurement 
effort); and (4) the diversion of resources that might have been ex-
pended on investigating frauds against the government.109  
Applying these factors to both the post-9/11 conflicts in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq, the court found the United States was “at 
war” from the authorizations for use of military force passed by 
Congress in each case, until the formal recognition of the Kar-
zai government in the case of Afghanistan, and until the Presi-
dent’s address declaring “major combat operations” over in the 
case of Iraq.110 While other courts have construed the WSLA “at 
 
445 (4th Cir. 1998) (cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1106 (1999)); Vogelaar v. United 
States, 665 F. Supp. 1295 (E. D. Mich. 1987) (holding that the combat activi-
ties exception to the FTCA bars claims against the United States based on an 
alleged failure to identify the remains of a service member killed in Vietnam, 
to the extent that the alleged omission occurred before the end of the Vietnam 
War); Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46 (D. Conn. 1971) (holding that the Vi-
etnam conflict is a “time of war” for purposes of the FTCA even though no 
formal declaration of war exists), aff’d, 455 F.2d 992 (1972); Williams v. Unit-
ed States, 115 F. Supp. 386 (N. D. Fla. 1953) (stating that the “time of war” 
exception to the FTCA is inapplicable to cases involving military aircraft ex-
plosions occurring in the United States), aff’d, 218 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955); cf. 
Saleh v. Titan, 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D. C. Cir. 2009) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2680j 
and concluding that “[d]uring wartime, where a private service contractor is 
integrated into combatant activities over which the military retains command 
authority, a tort claim arising out of the contractor's engagement in such ac-
tivities shall be preempted”). 
 108. United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225 (1952); see also United States v. 
Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436 (D. Mass. 2008) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 3287). 
 109. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 436. 
 110. Id. at 455. 
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war” trigger to turn on other events,111 none to date has sug-
gested the term was beyond standard methods of statutory in-
terpretation.  
B. WHERE THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE SURVIVES 
If the cases most directly requiring the Court to construe 
provisions pegging statutory authority to the existence of war-
time reveal no categorical refusal to adjudicate the question, 
what of political question doctrine more broadly? Whether or 
not the Court found the war-condition questions before it justi-
ciable in those particular cases, it is possible that a non-
justiciability principle should be understood to apply in other 
statutory settings. Where, for example, the nature of the con-
flict in which the United States is engaged is unusual, and 
where the existence of hostilities underlies a vast array of fed-
eral government powers exercised worldwide. As the Court has 
often explained, political question doctrine is “primarily a func-
tion of the separation of powers.”112 While “it is error” to assume 
every case touching on foreign relations is “beyond judicial cog-
nizance,” some cases more than others implicate the preroga-
tives of the other branches.113  
The Court’s most comprehensive effort to define the pa-
rameters of political question doctrine came in a case far re-
moved from matters of war or its duration, and in which the 
Court concluded that the dispute before it did not present a po-
litical question.114 Yet despite the dicta-twice-removed nature of 
1962’s Baker v. Carr, its frequent invocation in political ques-
tion debates makes it a necessary starting point here. Follow-
ing a detailed review of the Court’s political question jurispru-
dence to that point, the Baker Court famously identified six 
elements common to the cases it had found nonjusticiable:  
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to 
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable 
 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Pfluger, 685 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2012); Unit-
ed States v. Western Titanium, Inc., No. 08-CR-4229-JLS, 2010 WL 2650224 
(S. D. Cal. 2010) (holding that “extensive post-hoc factual determinations re-
quired by Prosperi render its application too ambiguous and uncertain in the 
context of a criminal statute of limitation,” thus the “at war” clause must be 
narrowly construed to include only wars formally declared by Congress).  
 112. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See infra Part IV for separation of 
powers considerations more broadly.  
 113. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. 
 114. Id. at 237 (holding a constitutional challenge to a state legislative re-
apportionment did not present a political question).  
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and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of de-
ciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due co-
ordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestion-
ing adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality 
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various de-
partments on one question.115 
In its review of prior foreign relations cases, the Baker 
Court emphasized two factors especially: “the lack of satisfacto-
ry criteria for a judicial determination,” and the need to 
“attribut[e] finality to the action of the political departments.”116 
While the decision to recognize a foreign government was, in 
these respects, the kind of discretionary decision without “judi-
cially discoverable standards” the Court thought not suscepti-
ble of judicial evaluation,117 the existence of hostilities was an-
other matter: 
Though it has been stated broadly that “the power which declared the 
necessity is the power to declare its cessation, and what the cessation 
requires,” here too analysis reveals isolable reasons for the presence 
of political questions, underlying this Court’s refusal to review the po-
litical departments’ determination of when or whether a war has end-
ed. Dominant is the need for finality in the political determination, for 
emergency’s nature demands “[A] prompt and unhesitating obedi-
ence.” . . . But deference rests on reason, not habit. The question in a 
particular case may not seriously implicate considerations of finali-
ty—e.g., a public program of importance (rent control) yet not central 
to the emergency effort. Further, clearly definable criteria for decision 
may be available. In such cases the political question barrier falls 
away: “[A] Court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mis-
take, when the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what is 
declared. . . . [It can] inquire whether the exigency still existed upon 
which the continued operation of the law depended.” On the other 
hand, even in private litigation which directly implicates no feature of 
separation of powers, lack of judicially discoverable standards and the 
drive for even-handed application may impel reference to the political 
departments’ determination of dates of hostilities’ beginning and end-
ing.118 
Both factors the Baker Court identifies as central to its 
analysis—the availability of “judicially discoverable standards” 
and a need for finality in the political determination, particu-
 
 115. Id. at 217. 
 116. Id. at 210. 
 117. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) 
(quoting Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890)). 
 118. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 213–14 (1962) (alterations to third quote 
in original) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
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larly (or perhaps solely) in an emergency—have benefited from 
some subsequent explication. 
The existence of “definable criteria” by which a legal deci-
sion may be made remains a determinant of overriding im-
portance in assessing justiciability. Indeed, rather than invari-
ably reciting Baker v. Carr’s full six-factor test, the Court has, 
in its handful of political-question cases since, emphasized this 
as one of few determinants still relevant in identifying the ex-
istence of a political question.119 Zivotofsky v. Clinton most re-
cently took this approach to determine whether the case before 
it had triggered the “narrow” political-question exception to the 
general rule that “the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide 
cases properly before it.”120 Zivotofsky, whose son was born in 
Jerusalem, had sued under the federal statute providing a 
cause of action for aggrieved parents to challenge the Secretary 
of State’s refusal to list Israel, rather than Jerusalem, as a 
child’s place of birth on his passport.121 Rejecting the argument 
embraced by the lower courts, that deciding Zivotofsky’s claim 
would have the courts impermissibly interfering with an exer-
cise of constitutional power committed to the executive alone, 
the Court emphasized that “[t]he existence of a statutory 
right . . . is certainly relevant to the Judiciary’s power” to de-
cide the case. As the majority reasoned:  
The federal courts are not being asked to supplant a foreign policy de-
cision of the political branches with the courts’ own unmoored deter-
mination of what United States policy toward Jerusalem should be. 
Instead, Zivotofsky requests that the courts enforce a specific statuto-
ry right. To resolve his claim, the Judiciary must decide if Zivotofsky’s 
interpretation of the statute is correct, and whether the statute is 
constitutional. This is a familiar judicial exercise.122  
 
 119. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).  
 120. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (identifying also the 
“textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department”).  
 121. Id. State Department guidelines had required passport officials to rec-
ord Jerusalem as the place of birth when requested by American parents for 
their child born in the country. Id. at 1424–25. When Congress passed a law 
requiring the Secretary of State to record Israel as the place of birth at a citi-
zen’s request—providing aggrieved plaintiffs with a statutory cause of action 
to enforce that right—the President challenged Congress’s authority, arguing 
that the statute impermissibly interfered with the President’s authority to 
conduct foreign affairs, and that plaintiffs’ case (challenging the Secretary’s 
refusal to record Israel as their son’s place of birth) presented a political ques-
tion. Id. at 1425. 
 122. Id. at 1427. 
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To determine whether judicially “definable criteria” could 
be found, the Court canvassed what scant constitutional text, 
structure, and history exists on whether the executive or Con-
gress was given constitutional primacy over the birthplace des-
ignation on passports. Relying on such guidance as the Presi-
dent’s Article II power to “receive Ambassadors and other 
public Ministers,” the Court concluded that there were ample 
“definable criteria” even in this constitutional realm to provide 
sufficient guidance for resolving the legal question of power.123  
Given the modern Court’s willingness to find adequate ju-
dicial guidance in even broad structural terms of the Constitu-
tion,124 it should be unsurprising that it has never found insuffi-
cient guidance for deciding questions of statutory 
interpretation. “As Baker plainly held . . . the courts have the 
authority to construe treaties and executive agreements, and it 
goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation 
is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts.”125 Thus, 
even where the interpretation of a federal statute would compel 
 
 123. See id. at 1428, 1430 (citing as relevant text the President’s Article II 
power to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” and Congress’s 
Article I powers over naturalization and foreign commerce). Zivotofsky’s con-
clusion in this regard is notably different from that of the Rehnquist plurality 
in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–03 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring). Rehnquist had reasoned that although the Constitution provided clear 
guidance on how a treaty was to be made, its silence on the question how a 
treaty could be terminated meant there was insufficient legal guidance for a 
court to settle the dispute about whether the termination power was the Pres-
ident’s alone. Id. The Zivotofsky Court, with arguably less textual guidance on 
the passport question, seemed untroubled by its analogous task of constitu-
tional interpretation.  
 124. More recently, a plurality of the Court found insufficiently managea-
ble standards for resolving a constitutional challenge to a congressional-
redistricting scheme. In Vieth v. Jubelirer, Justice Scalia explained that the 
Article III “judicial power” is “the power to act in the manner traditional for 
English and American courts.” 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (“Laws promulgated 
by the Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law pro-
nounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned 
distinctions.”). While the plurality despaired of finding a rational constitution-
al standard, Justice Kennedy concurred separately to emphasize that while 
“[t]he failings of the many proposed standards for measuring the burden a 
gerrymander imposes on representational rights make our intervention im-
proper[,] [i]f workable standards do emerge to measure these burdens, howev-
er, courts should be prepared to order relief.” Id. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).  
 125. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986); 
accord El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 856 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court has never applied 
the political question doctrine in a case involving alleged statutory violations. 
Never.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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the Secretary of Commerce to certify that Japan was not com-
plying with its treaty obligations—undermining the President’s 
recently concluded negotiations with Japan resolving the na-
tions’ whaling dispute, “a decision which calls for applying no 
more than the traditional rules of statutory construction, and 
then applying this analysis to the particular set of facts pre-
sented below”—was squarely within the Court’s power.126 
The Court in Japan Whaling Association v. American Ceta-
cean Society went on to side with the Secretary’s interpretation 
of the statute, holding that the statute did not compel certifica-
tion. But it reached its conclusion under the familiar adminis-
trative law test of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council.127 While interpretive deference is another 
mechanism by which the Court might mediate separation-of-
powers conflicts with the political branches—a point to which 
this Article returns in Part III below—it is quite a different ap-
proach than that required by political-question doctrine—
namely, foregoing the exercise of jurisdiction entirely.128  
In some contrast, the scope of the Baker factor regarding 
emergency-related interests in finality is rather less clear. To 
the extent the idea is that courts should hesitate to “interven[e] 
in exigent disputes,” judicial caution in such settings no doubt 
continues to prevail.129 Yet to the extent the factor is about an 
 
 126. Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230 (“We are cognizant of the interplay 
between these [statutory] Amendments and the conduct of this Nation’s for-
eign relations, and we recognize the premier role which both Congress and the 
Executive play in this field. But under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s 
characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsi-
bility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones.”). 
 127. Id. at 233; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 
U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (providing that if a statute is silent or ambiguous as to its 
meaning in the instant situation, the Court would defer to any reasonable con-
struction of the statute by the agency). 
 128. As John Hart Ely explained in the wake of the Japan Whaling deci-
sion, “[i]t is sometimes said that a question is ‘political’ if there is ‘a lack of ju-
dicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.’ The Court 
has come generally to recognize, however, that if the issue is otherwise proper-
ly before it . . . its first duty is to try to fashion manageable standards.” JOHN 
HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM 
AND ITS AFTERMATH 55–56 (1993) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).  
 129. See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1432 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring); see also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 43 (1849) (“Could the court, 
while the parties were actually contending in arms for the possession of the 
government, call witnesses before it and inquire which party represented a 
majority of the people? . . . If the judicial power extends so far, the guarantee 
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“unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political deci-
sion already made,”130 such that judicial review is inappropriate 
even after the exigency is passed, its continued salience is less 
certain. In the single security-related case post-Baker that the 
Supreme Court declined to adjudicate on political-question 
grounds, its ruling turned not on issues of exigency, but on the 
near-certain mootness of the question presented and on the tex-
tual commitment of the relevant power to the political branch-
es.131 Most recently, the Zivotofsky majority made no mention of 
the “finality” factor.132 In an illuminating concurrence, Justice 
Sotomayor emphasized that it is among the Baker factors that 
courts “should be particularly cautious” in invoking “before 
foregoing adjudication of a dispute.”133 As Sotomayor’s concur-
rence explains, many of the concerns that might drive an “unu-
sual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made” may be better handled through abstention 
doctrines, “under which considerations of justiciability or comi-
ty lead courts to abstain from deciding questions whose initial 
resolution is better suited to another time.”134  
The Court’s post-9/11 approach to statutory interpretation 
in security-related cases seems broadly in keeping with that 
more limited view of the relative unimportance of finality. In 
holding that a battlefield-captured U.S. citizen was entitled to 
due process to test the legality of his detention, the Court in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld emphasized in its ruling that a detainee’s 
 
contained in the Constitution of the United States is a guarantee of anarchy, 
not of order.”).  
 130 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) 
 131. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1973) (declining to assert 
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ due-process request for continuing judicial monitor-
ing of rules and training of Ohio National Guard on the grounds that, now 
that the Guard had already changed its rules and training to the requirements 
plaintiffs preferred, any judicial decree would be essentially advisory in na-
ture); see also id. at 6 (noting the power to “provide for organizing, arming and 
disciplining the Militia” was expressly allocated to Congress (citing U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8)).  
 132. Zivotofsky is consistent with earlier Supreme Court cases suggesting 
that textual commitment and judicially discoverable standards were the most 
important of the Baker factors. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 
(2004) (plurality opinion) (“These tests are probably listed in descending order 
of both importance and certainty.”); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 
(1993) (highlighting the first two Baker factors). 
 133. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432–33 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 134. Id. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see id. at 
1434 (“The doctrines of mootness, ripeness, and political question all originate 
in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language.”) (quoting DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)).  
PEARLSTEIN_4fmt 11/6/2014 4:13 PM 
2014] LAW AT THE END OF WAR 175 
 
process rights did not attach immediately upon capture in the 
throes of battle.135 Nonetheless, once the government had decid-
ed the detainee should continue to be held, the Court was will-
ing to engage so far as insisting that due process was re-
quired.136 Once the exigency had passed, so too the justification 
for judicial abstention. Likewise in 2006’s Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, involving a challenge to the legality of the original 
military-commission trial system, the Supreme Court (with the 
lower courts) brushed aside vigorous government arguments 
that it should abstain from deciding the case, at least until Mr. 
Hamdan’s commission prosecution had concluded.137  
Yet despite the apparent narrowing of the Baker criteria 
for determining the applicability of the political-question doc-
trine to a more manageable two—the existence of “judicially 
manageable standards” for adjudication, and (Zivotofsky re-
minds us) the absence of a textual commitment of the issue to 
another branch—there is a final case in the Court’s post-9/11 
jurisprudence necessary to examine in this context. In 2008’s 
Munaf v. Geren, U.S. citizen habeas petitioners had raised the 
prospect that a federal statute prohibiting transfer to foreign 
 
 135. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531–32 (2004) (recognizing the gov-
ernment’s concern that additional process for detainees would mean soldiers 
“engaged in the serious work of waging battle would be unnecessarily and 
dangerously distracted by litigation half a world away”).  
 136. Id. at 534–35 (“The parties agree that initial captures on the battle-
field need not receive the process we have discussed here; that process is due 
only when the determination is made to continue to hold those who have been 
seized. . . . [A]rguments that military officers ought not have to wage war un-
der the threat of litigation lose much of their steam when factual disputes at 
enemy-combatant hearings are limited to the alleged combatant’s acts. This 
focus meddles little, if at all, in the strategy or conduct of war, inquiring only 
into the appropriateness of continuing to detain an individual claimed to have 
taken up arms against the United States.” (emphasis omitted)). But cf. Al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (denying plaintiff injunction 
against military targeting of U.S. citizen abroad absent finding of “imminent” 
threat, to be enforced “through an after-the-fact contempt motion or an after-
the-fact damages action”); see id. at 48 (“‘It is not the role of judges to second-
guess, with the benefit of hindsight, another branch’s determination that the 
interests of the United States call for military action.’ Such military determi-
nations are textually committed to the political branches. Moreover, any post 
hoc judicial assessment as to the propriety of the Executive’s decision to em-
ploy military force abroad ‘would be anathema to . . . separation of powers’ 
principles. . . . [A]ny after-the-fact judicial review of the Executive’s decision to 
employ military force abroad would reveal a ‘lack of respect due coordinate 
branches of government’ and create ‘the potentiality of embarrassment of mul-
tifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.’” (first al-
teration in original) (citations omitted)). 
 137. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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custody where there was a likelihood of torture would bar their 
transfer from U.S. to Iraqi custody to face criminal prosecu-
tion.138 In a per curiam opinion, the Court refused to inquire be-
yond the executive’s determination that the detainees were not 
likely to face torture.139  
The Solicitor General explains that such determinations are based on 
“the Executive’s assessment of the foreign country’s legal system 
and . . . the Executive[’s] . . . ability to obtain foreign assurances it 
considers reliable.” The Judiciary is not suited to second-guess such 
determinations—determinations that would require federal courts to 
pass judgment on foreign justice systems and undermine the Gov-
ernment’s ability to speak with one voice in this area. In contrast, the 
political branches are well situated to consider sensitive foreign policy 
issues, such as whether there is a serious prospect of torture at the 
hands of an ally, and what to do about it if there is.140  
It is not entirely clear what to make of the Munaf Court’s 
refusal to consider the validity of the Executive’s determination 
of the likelihood of torture. The Court indicated that because 
the issue had not been especially litigated on certiorari, it 
would refuse to consider the question on its merits.141 And the 
Court does not mention political-question doctrine per se, much 
less cite Baker or its progeny. Yet the concerns the Munaf 
Court raises plainly echo some of the less favored Baker crite-
ria—“the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potential-
ity of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.”142 And the concerns re-
call non-jurisdictional instances in which the Court has ceased 
its interpretive inquiry in favor of the executive’s statutory in-
terpretation on similar grounds.143 At a minimum, it seems wise 
to leave open the possibility that considerations of embarrass-
ment may yet inform the Court’s evaluation of statutory claims.  
 
 138. 553 U.S. 674 (2008). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 702–03 (citations omitted) (“If we are to be one nation in any re-
spect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.” (citing THE FEDERAL-
IST NO. 42, at 279 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961))). 
 141. Id. at 703.  
 142. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 186 (1962).  
 143. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 
(1936). 
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II.  THE MANY WORDS FOR WAR   
While the previous Part demonstrates that there is no cat-
egorical political-question bar to judicial interpretation of stat-
utory existence-of-hostilities triggers, it leaves open the possi-
bility that the determination whether we are at war may yet 
present a political question in certain statutory settings—
where the law lacks judicially manageable standards for inter-
pretation, or where the issue has been textually committed by 
the Constitution to another branch of government.144 This Part 
thus examines whether the doctrine precludes judicial resolu-
tion of the war conditions applicable in two contemporary stat-
utes: the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA) and the Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force of 2001 (AUMF).145  
The MCA provides that offenses are triable by military 
commission “only if the offense is committed in the context of 
and associated with hostilities.”146 Courts now face, for example, 
the question whether commission defendants charged with acts 
committed before the attacks of 9/11 acted “in the context of 
and associated with hostilities.”147 Separately, the AUMF has 
been a central font of authority for the conduct of U.S. counter-
terrorism operations, including the power to detain and lethally 
target individuals who are “part of or supporting Taliban or al 
Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostili-
ties against the United States or its coalition partners.”148 As 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the AUMF delegates to the 
President the power to use force only “for the duration of these 
hostilities.”149 With the planned withdrawal of U.S. combat forc-
 
 144. See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).  
 145. 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c) (2012); Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). 
 146. 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c) (emphasis added). 
 147. See, e.g., Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (Hamdan II), overruled on other grounds by Al Bahlul v. United States, 
No. 11-1324, 2014 WL 3437458 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v. Hamdan, 
801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1278 (C.M.C.R. 2011), overruled by Hamdan II, 696 
F.3d at 1238; see also Al-Nashiri v. MacDonald, No. 11-5907, 2012 WL 
1642306 (W.D. Wash. 2012), aff’d, 741 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 148. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 870, 872, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
reh’g denied en banc, 619 F.3d 1 (2010).  
 149. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (emphasis added); see 
also id. at 520 (“It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that de-
tention may last no longer than active hostilities. See Article 118 of the Gene-
va Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, [1955] 6 U.S. T. 3316, 3406, T. I. A. S. No. 3364 (‘Prisoners of war shall 
be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostili-
ties.’).”).  
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es from Afghanistan, those still detained by the United States 
pursuant to the AUMF may thus present habeas courts with 
arguments that “these hostilities” have come to an end.150  
In both statutory contexts, the term “hostilities” is defined 
with reference to the meaning of that term under the interna-
tional law of war, also known as international humanitarian 
law or the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Under the MCA, the 
meaning of “hostilities” is set forth in a definitions section at 
the outset of the statute as “any conflict subject to the laws of 
war.”151 In interpreting the AUMF, the Supreme Court likewise 
relied on LOAC in noting that “detention may last no longer 
than active hostilities,”152 and Congress has since affirmed the 
President’s authority to detain under the AUMF is “pending 
disposition under the law of war.”153 Understanding the rele-
vant provisions of LOAC is thus essential to determining 
whether there are judicially manageable standards for inter-
preting the statutes. Below, LOAC is primarily addressed in 
the MCA discussion that is first to follow; to the extent the ap-
plication of LOAC differs or needs elaboration with respect to 
the AUMF, it is addressed again in the discussion of that stat-
ute. A final section then considers whether the Constitution 
must be read to commit the determination of the existence of 
hostilities to one of the political branches. Throughout, it is use-
ful to keep in mind that the answer to the question of when war 
ends under international law is in key respects the same as the 
answer to that question under domestic law: it depends why, in 
relation to what power, one wants to know. 
A. THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT 
The question of the existence of hostilities arises in prose-
cutions under the MCA in two ways. First, the statute provides 
that the war crimes offenses it enumerates are triable by mili-
 
 150. See, e.g., Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878. Indeed, the first such petition in 
the latest generation of Guantanamo habeas litigation has now been filed. See 
Motion of Petitioner for Judgment on His Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
Idris v. Obama, No. 05-1555 (D.D.C. June 28, 2013).  
 151. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(9) (2012).  
 152. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repat-
riated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”) (quoting Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 
1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, 75 U.N.T.S. 135); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878.  
 153. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011) [hereinafter 2012 NDAA]; Ike Skelton National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, H.R. 6523, 111th Cong. § 1032 
(enacted) [hereinafter 2011 NDAA]. 
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tary commission “only if the offense is committed in the context 
of and associated with hostilities.”154 It is thus necessary to 
prove the existence of hostilities as an element of each charging 
offense. Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad Al Nashiri, for ex-
ample, has been charged with a set of military commission of-
fenses for his alleged involvement in the 2000 bombing of the 
USS Cole. Among Al Nashiri’s defenses: the conduct of which 
he has been accused occurred before the attacks of September 
11, 2001, and was thus not committed “in the context of and as-
sociated with hostilities.”155 
The existence of hostilities is also, separately, relevant in 
establishing the military commission’s jurisdiction at the out-
set. Commission jurisdiction extends only to persons subject to 
trial under the MCA, namely “alien unprivileged enemy bellig-
erents,” a term defined by the statute to include three types of 
defendant. The first two include defendants who  “engaged in 
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,” 
or who have “purposefully and materially supported hostilities 
against the United States or its coalition partners.”156 In cases 
involving such defendants, unless the defendant is alleged to 
have engaged in or supported “hostilities” as defined by the law 
of war, the commissions lack jurisdiction to proceed. The third 
category of defendant over whom the military commission may 
have jurisdiction—an individual who was “a part of Al Qaeda” 
when the alleged offense was committed—does not by its terms 
require a finding of hostilities.157 But even where the existence 
of hostilities is not part of the statutory requirement for juris-
diction, commission jurisdiction remains subject to limits im-
posed by the U.S. Constitution. As the Supreme Court has not-
ed, absent martial law or military occupation, military 
commissions may substitute for civilian trials or traditional 
military justice processes to prosecute only those acts “incident 
 
 154. 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c). The term “hostilities” is defined as “any conflict 
subject to the laws of war.” 10 U.S.C. § 948a(9). As the D.C. Circuit recognized, 
the law of war “has long been understood to mean the international law of 
war.” Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 603, 610 (2006) (plurality opinion)); id. at 641 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring); accord Ex Parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1, 27–30, 35–36 
(1942). 
 155.  See Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner’s Motion for a Pre-
liminary Injunction at 8, Al Nashiri v. Obama, No. 08-Civ-1207 (D.D.C. May 1, 
2014), available at https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B0Q2o8mqTlrzbWt5cXBR 
T21RMWs. 
 156.  Id.  
 157. 10 U.S.C. § 948a. 
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to the conduct of war,” for events occurring “within the period of 
the war.”158 In this setting, commissions are only constitutional-
ly permissible when the offense alleged was “committed . . . 
during, not before, the relevant conflict.”159 The need to consider 
the existence of war in some fashion is thus unavoidable in es-
tablishing commission jurisdiction.  
The different contexts in which the issue arises highlight 
the complexity of understanding which decision-making actor is 
best suited to the determination. The question of the commis-
sion’s jurisdiction—either as a statutory or constitutional mat-
ter—seems manifestly a question of law, presumably resolvable 
with reliance on ordinary tools of statutory interpretation (in-
cluding any applicable canons of deference). Yet the MCA also 
makes “hostilities” an element of each offense; the U.S. Consti-
tution requires that elements of criminal offenses be proven by 
the prosecution to commission members (the commission 
equivalent of a jury) beyond a reasonable doubt.160 Could the 
presiding officer (the commission equivalent of a judge) deter-
mine “hostilities” or “the relevant conflict” were sufficient to es-
tablish its jurisdiction, and the members then conclude after 
trial that the prosecution had not succeeded in proving the ex-
istence of hostilities as an element of the offense? In principle, 
yes.161 For present purposes, the following analysis treats the 
 
 158. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 595–97 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, 
JJ., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28–29; 
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 837 (2d ed. 1920)); see 
also id. at 597 (quoting WINTRHOP, supra) (“No jurisdiction exists to try of-
fenses ‘committed either before or after the war.’”). 
 159. Id. at 600; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitu-
tional Limit on Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 295 
(2010).  
 160. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (quoting United 
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)) (also citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 
508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 385, 364 (1970) (affirming 
that the defendant was entitled to “a jury determination that [he] is guilty of 
every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable 
doubt” and noting that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 
to constitute the crime with which he is charged”)). This is indeed how the 
question was treated when it arose in the prosecution of Salim Hamdan for 
material support to Al Qaeda. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 
1278 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 2011) (en banc), rev’d, Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 
1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Al Bahlul v. United 
States, No. 11-1324, 2014 WL 3437485 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2014).  
 161. The resolution to this question turns in part on a host of issues beyond 
the scope of this Article, including continued uncertainty about the extent to 
which the U.S. Constitution applies in commission proceedings at Guantana-
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existence-of-hostilities question as one for the court—both be-
cause the jurisdictional test requires it, and because, even if the 
determination ultimately requires a finding of fact, the presid-
ing officer must in all events provide members with a jury in-
struction of what “hostilities” means as a matter of law.162  
Deciding whether Al Nashiri is guilty of a war crime then 
requires the court to determine whether his alleged conduct 
was committed “in the context of and associated with hostili-
ties”—that is, “any conflict subject to the laws of war.”163 Before 
discussing the meaning of “hostilities” within that body of law, 
a brief note on interpretive background may be helpful. LOAC 
is codified in the first instance in a set of treaties called the Ge-
neva Conventions, each of which the United States has signed 
and ratified, and each of which provide individuals caught up 
in armed conflict with a basic set of humanitarian protec-
tions.164 In addition to the four principal Geneva treaties, many 
states have adopted two related treaties, called Additional Pro-
tocols, elaborating on the law described in the four main trea-
ties.165 While the United States has not ratified either of the 
Additional Protocols, it recognizes a number of their provisions 
as customary international law—that is, as binding on the 
United States nonetheless.166 Beyond the treaty texts them-
 
mo Bay. Hamdan II, 696 F.3d at 1245. The article returns to other aspects of 
the question in Part II.C, below. 
 162. Drawing on the applicable international law precedent discussed be-
low, the commission presiding officer in United States v. Hamdan did just 
that. 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1278 n.54 (quoting Hamdan Tr. 3752–53). 
 163. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(9), 950p(c) (2012).  
 164. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 
75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva III, supra note 5; Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].  
 165. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [here-
inafter Protocol II]. 
 166. See Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Fact Sheet: New Ac-
tions on Guantanamo and Detainee Policy, LAWFARE (Mar. 7, 2011), http:// 
www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Fact_Sheet_-
_Guantanamo_and_Detainee_Policy.pdf (calling on the Senate to ratify Proto-
col II and recognizing Article 75 of Additional Protocol I as customary interna-
tional law).  
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selves, the Commentaries to the Conventions—prepared at the 
time the Conventions were drafted, essentially as a form of in-
terpretive ‘legislative’ history—are considered by courts and le-
gal scholars as a highly persuasive source of meaning.167 Final-
ly, the meaning of LOAC “hostilities” has been elucidated by a 
number of national and international courts whose rulings, 
while of varying degrees of binding significance, now regularly 
inform judicial interpretations in the field. This section relies 
on all of these sources in elucidating the meaning of hostilities. 
Questions of the existence of war under LOAC arise most 
commonly in two interpretive settings. The first is in efforts to 
define the LOAC term “armed conflict,” the existence of which 
triggers the applicability of the entire body of law, as set forth 
in Common Articles 2 and 3 of all four Geneva Conventions. 
The issue has arisen internationally most often just as it now 
arises in the example of the MCA—in determining whether war 
crimes tribunal jurisdiction exists. Violations of certain provi-
sions of the Geneva Conventions constitute “grave breaches” of 
the treaties, and may be prosecutable as war crimes before a 
jurisdictionally relevant tribunal. War crimes are not prosecut-
able as such unless there is a war; thus, various war crimes tri-
bunals have had to determine whether and when a dispute rose 
to the level of “armed conflict” within the meaning of LOAC 
such that war crimes jurisdiction may attach.168 Second, LOAC 
elsewhere uses the term “hostilities” expressly, as in Common 
Article 3, which defines the group of individuals entitled to its 
protection as those “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hos-
tilities.”169 Perhaps most relevant for AUMF purposes, dis-
 
 167. See, e.g., JEAN DE PREUX ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
COMMENTARY III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet, ed., A.P. de Heney, trans., 1960). The In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary is widely viewed 
as the informal legislative history of the Conventions. See, e.g., Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 620 n.48 (2006) (“The International Committee of the 
Red Cross is referred to by name in several provisions of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and is the body that drafted and published the official commen-
tary to the Conventions. Though not binding law, the commentary is, as the 
parties recognize, relevant in interpreting the Conventions' provisions.”); 
RICHARD P. DIMEGLIO ET AL., THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & 
SCH., U.S. ARMY, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 22 (William J. Johnson 
& Andrew D. Gillman, eds., 2012) (“The [ICRC] commentaries provide critical 
explanations to many treaty provisions, and are therefore similar to legislative 
history in the domestic context.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion & Judg-
ment ¶ 562 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). 
 169. Geneva III, supra note 5, art. 3. 
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cussed below, in setting forth rules governing the disposition of 
prisoners at the end of an international armed conflict, Article 
118 of the Third Geneva Convention provides that “[p]risoners 
of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the 
cessation of active hostilities.”170 Because the terms “armed con-
flict” and “hostilities” are themselves different, and appear in 
different provisions of the Conventions, the following discussion 
treats them each separately. But both are relevant for under-
standing the meaning of “hostilities” within the statutory con-
text of the MCA and AUMF.  
1. The Existence of an Armed Conflict 
The Geneva Conventions recognize two kinds of armed con-
flict: international (a conflict between one or more states) and 
non-international (a conflict between a state party and a non-
state actor, or between two or more non-state actors).171 In its 
global counterterrorism operations post-9/11, the United States 
has taken the position that it is involved in a non-international 
armed conflict (NIAC) with the Taliban, and with the terrorist 
organization Al Qaeda and “associated forces.”172 While the 
ICRC has never embraced the view “that a conflict of global 
dimensions is or has been taking place [between the United 
States and Al Qaeda],”173 a point to which the Article returns 
 
 170. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (quoting Geneva III, su-
pra note 5, art. 118). Article 118 further states: 
In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement 
concluded between the Parties to the conflict with a view to the cessa-
tion of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of the Detain-
ing Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of 
repatriation in conformity with the principle laid down in the forego-
ing paragraph.  
Geneva III, supra note 5, art. 118. 
 171. See, e.g., Geneva III, supra note 5, at arts. 2–3.  
 172. See Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Det. 
Auth. Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1–2, In re: Guan-
tanamo Bay Detainee Litig. Misc., No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf.  
 173. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 31IC/11/5.1.2, INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CON-
FLICTS 10 (2011), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross 
-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-
challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf; see also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
30IC/07/8.4, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF 
CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 8 (2007), available at http://www.icrc 
.org/eng/assets/files/other/ihl-challenges-30th-international 
-conference-eng.pdf (“IHL rules on what constitutes the lawful taking of life or 
on detention in international armed conflicts, for example, allow for more flex-
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below, this section examines NIAC-related law in light of the 
U.S. view. 
Common Article 3, which prohibits torture and unfair tri-
als, among other things, recognizes “armed conflict not of an in-
ternational character occurring in the territory of one of the 
High Contracting Parties.”174 The phrase “not of an interna-
tional character” is meant to distinguish such conflicts from 
those described in Common Article 2 of the Conventions as con-
flicts between “two or more of the High Contracting Parties.”175 
As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
a NIAC is “distinguishable from the conflict described in Com-
mon Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a clash be-
tween nations (whether signatories or not). In context, then, 
the phrase ‘not of an international character’ bears its literal 
meaning.”176 While there remains substantial dispute surround-
ing the extent to which NIACs exist under law transnational-
ly—that is, not simply as a conflict internal to a single state—
the requirement that an armed conflict must occur “in the ter-
ritory of one of the High Contracting Parties” of itself is a small 
hurdle; the Geneva Conventions have now been ratified by eve-
ry nation in the world.177  
From the outset of treaty negotiations, it was clear that 
Common Article 3 NIACs were meant to encompass internal 
armed conflicts or civil wars, which had not been plainly cov-
ered by the Geneva regime until the modern conventions of 
 
ibility than the rules applicable in non-armed conflicts governed by other bod-
ies of law. . . . [I]t is both dangerous and unnecessary, in practical terms, to 
apply IHL to situations that do not amount to war.”). 
 174. Geneva III, supra note 5, art. 3. Common Article 3 provides a baseline 
set of safeguards against torture and other cruel treatment for a broad set of 
protected persons. 
 175. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) (citing Geneva III, su-
pra note 5, art. 2).  
 176. Id. at 630–31 (citing CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 annex II at 1355 (Yves Sandoz et 
al., eds., Tony Langham et al. trans., 1987)) (“[A] non-international armed con-
flict is distinct from an international armed conflict because of the legal status 
of the entities opposing each other . . . .”).  
 177. How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humani-
tarian Law?, ICRC, 3, 5 (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/ 
other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf (“Non-international armed conflicts are 
protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forc-
es and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising 
on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva Conventions]. The armed con-
frontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in 
the conflict must show a minimum of organisation.”). 
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1949. It was also clear that the primary interpretive challenge 
arising from the advent of Common Article 3 would center on 
how to distinguish an “armed conflict” from any lesser “act 
committed by force of arms.”178 What was the difference be-
tween a war on the one hand, and terrorism, domestic riots, or 
simple crime on the other? The distinction was of no small mo-
ment to state parties. States, while accepting of the need for 
basic humanitarian protections in the bloody civil wars that 
had proliferated in the decades before the modern Conventions 
were ratified, had previously viewed all such matters as proper-
ly within the realm of sovereign discretion. Among states’ other 
concerns was the “risk of ordinary criminals being encouraged 
to give themselves a semblance of organization as a pretext for 
claiming the benefit of the Convention, representing their 
crimes as ‘acts of war’ in order to escape [criminal] punishment 
for them.”179  
Despite this concern, negotiators rejected limiting lan-
guage that would have rendered Common Article 3 applicable 
“especially [to] cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of 
religion.”180 They likewise rejected a set of criteria some had de-
veloped for determining whether violence had reached the level 
of armed conflict, including whether the non-state actor had an 
“organized military force,” with “an authority responsible for its 
acts”; and that the legal government “recognized the insurgents 
as belligerents,” and was “obliged to have recourse to the regu-
lar military forces” in response.181 While acknowledging the cri-
teria as “convenient” but not at all “obligatory,” the Commen-
tary ultimately urged that “the scope of the . . . Article must be 
as wide as possible.” In essence, the Commentaries less-than-
helpfully concluded: “the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are 
armed conflicts, with ‘armed’ forces on either side engaged in 
‘hostilities.’”182 
 
 178. OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMEN-
TARY IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN 
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 35–36 (Jean S. Pictet, ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. 
Dumbleton, trans., 1958); see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 
Opinion & Judgment ¶ 562 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 
1997) (describing the need for factors to distinguish a NIAC from “banditry, 
unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not 
subject to international humanitarian law”).  
 179.  DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 167, at 32. 
 180. Id. at 31. 
 181. Id. at 36. 
 182. Id. at 37. 
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The Commentaries’ seemingly tautological definition 
gained substantial clarification during the proceedings of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), an international court created by U.N. Security Council 
Resolution in 1993 to conduct trials for war crimes arising out 
of the conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo.183 Drawing on the Com-
mentaries for guidance, the case of Prosecutor v. Tadic gave the 
ICTY an opportunity to elaborate on the Common Article 3 def-
inition of armed conflict for purposes of determining whether 
an “armed conflict” existed at the time the allegedly unlawful 
conduct occurred. In Tadic, the Court held that a NIAC exists 
when two factors are present: “protracted armed violence be-
tween governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State.”184 In a brief analysis ap-
plying this standard, the Tadic court concluded that the vio-
lence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1992 had been suffi-
cient. While noting the relevance of official intergovernmental 
acts acknowledging the hostilities—in that case, the UN Secu-
rity Council had acted during this period to maintain peace and 
security in the region—the court most heavily emphasized the 
intensity of hostilities—how many casualties sustained, how 
much property destroyed, how many refugees displaced.185 
Subsequent ICTY decisions elaborated on the intensity of 
“protracted armed violence” required, developing a robust list of 
factors to be considered in a totality-of-the-circumstances type 
inquiry.186 The lengthy list of determinants the court came to 
examine was predominated by factual indicators of violence: 
the number, duration, and intensity of individual confronta-
tions; types of weapons used; number and types of forces en-
 
 183. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 184.  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ¶ 70, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 185. Id. at ¶¶ 73–77. 
 186. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delali , Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment ¶ 134 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (describing a two-
day artillery bombardment killing villagers, destroying property, and creating 
numerous refugees); see also Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, 
Judgment ¶ 248 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008); 
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008). Prosecutor v. Mrkši , Case No. 
IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment ¶ 419 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Sept. 27, 2007); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment ¶ 90 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v. Milosovic, 
Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal ¶¶ 27–32 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004).  
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gaged in the fighting; the geographic and temporal distribution 
of clashes (including whether attacks were increasing over the 
relevant period); any territory captured; the extent of material 
destruction; the number of civilians fleeing combat zones; and 
of course the number of casualties.187 Only one factor on the list 
required semi-direct consideration of the government’s political 
decision-making: whether the government felt obliged to use 
military (not just police) force in response to insurgent attacks.  
The ICTY cases likewise shed light on the second require-
ment that a non-state party to the conflict possess organized 
armed forces, with an identifiable command structure and the 
capacity to sustain military operations.188 The degree of the 
non-state party’s organization could also be determined by as-
sessing a range of factual criteria: the group’s organizational 
structure; its ability to recruit and train fighters and conduct 
operations using military weapons and tactics; its recognition 
(formal or otherwise) by international representatives and its 
ability to enter peace or cease-fire agreements; its ability to is-
sue and enforce internal regulations; its ability to coordinate 
multiple units; and any degree of territorial control and admin-
istration.189  
As LOAC scholars have since pointed out, the effect of the 
two-part ICTY standard has been to clarify the objective nature 
of the inquiry in the interest of ensuring law application: 
Just as Common Article 2’s paradigm for international armed conflict 
eliminates the opportunity for states to engage in law avoidance by 
creating an objective trigger untethered to declarations of war or oth-
er public pronouncements, so Common Article 3 also introduced the 
same objective approach to internal armed conflict. . . . [T]he nature 
of the government’s actions cannot be the determinative or exclusive 
component, for the very reason that the [Geneva] Conventions substi-
tuted the term ‘armed conflict’ for war: any trigger for the law that 
 
 187. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T ¶ 49; Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T¶¶ 
135–43; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment ¶¶ 
564–65 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). 
 188. See, e.g., Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T ¶¶ 84, 135–70 (detailing the hos-
tilities criterion); id. ¶¶ 94–134 (discussing the organized forces criterion); 
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T ¶¶ 561–68; see also INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT” DEFINED IN INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? (2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/ 
eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. 
 189. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment ¶ 884 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009); Haradinaj, Case 
No. IT-04-84-T ¶ 60; Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T ¶¶ 95–109. 
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rests solely on governmental rhetoric or action will lose that essential 
objectivity.190 
At the same time, some have cautioned that applying too 
formulaic a test to the determination can have the effect of un-
dermining the protection of humanitarian interests that is the 
central purpose of the LOAC. In the context of the current 
bloody civil war in Syria, for instance, Laurie R. Blank and 
Geoffrey S. Corn note that the international community failed 
to “acknowledge the existence of armed conflict until the legal-
istic elements test was apparently objectively satisfied in the 
summer of 2012, at least fifteen months after the violence 
erupted.”191 Blank and Corn argue that such reluctance is espe-
cially troubling given “the motivation for adopting the armed 
conflict trigger: mitigate the impact of technical legal formulas 
when determining the applicability of humanitarian protec-
tions.”192  
Blank and Corn are surely right in cautioning against the 
application of an overly technical definition if its effect is to 
weaken the humanitarian protections that animate the entire 
body of law. In the case of Syria, it may be that other states’ re-
luctance to acknowledge the existence of an armed conflict 
there further emboldened the Syrian Government to use force 
in ways manifestly contrary to the law of war. However, it is 
not clear that the non-recognition of armed conflict will invari-
ably have this effect. As the ICRC and others have noted, be-
cause LOAC “rules governing the use of force and detention for 
security reasons are less restrictive than the rules applicable 
outside of armed conflicts governed by other bodies of law,” it is 
“inappropriate and unnecessary to apply” LOAC to circum-
stances not amounting to armed conflict.193 Humanitarian in-
terests could equally be compromised when states use the 
armed conflict designation as a way of circumventing greater 
legal protections that would otherwise apply in times of peace. 
Indeed, LOAC in many places recognizes the applicability of 
 
 190. Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: 
Syria, Law, and the Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 693, 711 (2013). 
 191. Id. at 696.  
 192. Id. at 697. 
 193. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED 
CONFLICTS (2011) (incorporating by referencing the INTERNATIONAL COMMIT-
TEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICT (2007)).  
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certain of its provisions unless the individuals to be protected 
would receive more favorable treatment under some other body 
of law.194 In this respect, the law is designed to be flexible 
enough to apply as a baseline, but not a ceiling, of humanitari-
an protections. 
2. The Cessation of Hostilities 
As the foregoing demonstrates, “protracted armed violence” 
(as the ICTY puts it) or “hostilities” (in the Commentaries’ 
term) is one of two central elements in the Conventions’ defini-
tion of “armed conflict.” Yet the Conventions at times use the 
term “hostilities” independently as well. In particular, in set-
ting forth rules governing the disposition of prisoners at the 
end of an international armed conflict, Article 118 of the Third 
Geneva Convention provides that “[p]risoners of war shall be 
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of 
active hostilities.”195 While Article 118’s requirement that pris-
oners be released when “active hostilities” are over applies by 
its terms only to situations of international armed conflict, it is 
relevant here at least by analogy and perhaps as more direct 
interpretive guidance as well. It is Article 118 on which the 
Hamdi plurality relied in holding that the AUMF authorized 
the detention of certain individuals “engaged in an armed con-
flict against the United States,” only “for the duration of these 
hostilities.”196  
 
 194. See, e.g., Geneva III, supra note 5, art. 4 (recognizing the entitlement 
of “merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the con-
flict” to prisoner of war protection if they “do not benefit by more favourable 
treatment under any other provisions of international law”). 
 195. Id. art. 118 (“In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any 
agreement concluded between the Parties to the conflict with a view to the 
cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of the Detaining 
Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of repatriation 
in conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph.”).  
 196. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (emphasis added); see 
also id. at 520 (“It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that de-
tention may last no longer than active hostilities. See Article 118 of the Gene-
va Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, [1955] 6 U.S. T. 3316, 3406, T. I. A. S. No. 3364 (‘Prisoners of war shall 
be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostili-
ties’).”); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied 
en banc, 619 F.3d 1 (2010). The Hamdi Court limited its analysis to the con-
flict in Afghanistan in which they understood Yaser Hamdi had been cap-
tured, noting that “[a]ctive combat operations against Taliban fighters appar-
ently are ongoing in Afghanistan,” and holding that “[t]he United States may 
detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legitimately deter-
mined to be Taliban combatants.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (“If the record es-
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The purpose of marking the cessation or close of “hostili-
ties” in the detention provision of Article 118, as well as in 
analogous portions in the related Conventions,197 is addressed 
in the Commentaries with some clarity. 
In calling for the general repatriation of all prisoners of war once ac-
tive hostilities have ceased, the 1949 Diplomatic Conference took ac-
count of the experience of the Second World War. It recognized that 
captivity is a painful situation which must be ended as soon as possi-
ble, and was anxious that repatriation should take place rapidly and 
that prisoners of war should not be retained in captivity on various 
pretexts. In time of war, the internment of captives is justified by a 
legitimate concern—to prevent military personnel from taking up 
arms once more against the captor State. That reason no longer exists 
once the fighting is over.198 
Negotiators were particularly conscious of avoiding the 
perceived inadequacies of the predecessor Geneva Conventions 
on this point. Cognizant that hostilities could cease well before 
any peace treaty or formal settlement was adopted (if ever it 
was), it was “essential to lay down that repatriation should 
take place as soon as possible after the end of hostilities, and to 
make this requirement unilateral so that its implementation 
would not be hampered by the difficulty of obtaining the con-
sent of both parties.”199 As with the recognition of the existence 
of an “armed conflict” in the first instance, the cessation of hos-
tilities would depend on a factually objective test: “The words 
‘close of hostilities’ express a notion which has already been 
met with several times in the Convention: they mean the actual 
end of the fighting and not the official termination of a state of 
belligerency.”200  
 
tablishes that United States troops are still involved in active combat in Af-
ghanistan, those detentions are part of the exercise of ‘necessary and appro-
priate force,’ and therefore are authorized by the AUMF.”). 
 197. See, e.g., Geneva IV, supra note 177, art. 46 (“In so far as they have 
not been previously withdrawn, restrictive measures taken regarding protect-
ed persons shall be cancelled as soon as possible after the close of hostilities. 
Restrictive measures affecting their property shall be cancelled, in accordance 
with the law of the Detaining Power, as soon as possible after the close of hos-
tilities.”); id. art. 49 (“[T]he Occupying Power may undertake total or partial 
evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative mili-
tary reasons so demand. . . . Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back 
to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.”); id. 
art. 133 (“Internment shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostili-
ties.”).  
 198. DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 166, at 546–47. 
 199. Id. at 541. 
 200. UHLER ET AL., supra note 177, at 270; id. at 514–515 (“The expression 
‘the close of hostilities’ should be taken to mean a state of fact rather than the 
legal situation covered by laws or decrees fixing the date of cessation of hostili-
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As the next section discusses, an argument might be made 
that Article 118 is not the LOAC element that most usefully in-
forms the interpretation of the AUMF here. It is, after all, 
strictly applicable only in international armed conflicts, and 
was designed to ensure that the members of state armed forces 
were returned promptly to their home country at war’s end. 
Some scholars have thus suggested it might be more appropri-
ate to look to other Geneva provisions that require release from 
detention not when fighting stops, but rather when the reason 
for the individual’s detention—for example, the threat he poses 
to security—ceases to exist.201 For reasons discussed below, this 
Article concludes such an interpretation of the AUMF is unlike-
ly to be correct.202 For present purposes, it may suffice to note 
the prospect of a difference between Article 118 “hostilities” 
and the statutory meaning of the AUMF.  
3. Applying the Law in Al-Nashiri’s Case 
A “conflict subject to the laws of war”—the language used 
in the MCA statute to define the kind of “hostilities” giving rise 
to commission jurisdiction—seems plainly to mean an “armed 
conflict” as defined by Common Articles 2 or 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions—a finding of which triggers the application of the 
Geneva law-of-war regime. In Al-Nashiri’s case, the United 
States alleges a non-international armed conflict between the 
United States and Al-Qaeda, and thus embraces the definition 
described above by Tadic—a condition of “protracted armed vio-
lence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State.”203  
 
ties. The similar provision concerning prisoners of war speaks of ‘the cessation 
of active hostilities’ and the wording of the paragraph here should be under-
stood in the same sense.”); see also id. at 270 (“This rule, which is in accord-
ance with the usual practice among States, is justified by the fact that a fairly 
long time may elapse between the close of hostilities and the conclusion of a 
peace treaty; during that time the continuation of security and control 
measures would no longer be warranted.”).  
 201. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 2124; John B. 
Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary 
Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing 
Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 202 (2011).  
 202. See infra Part III.  
 203. See Government Response to Defense Motion To Dismiss Because the 
Convening Authority Exceeded His Power in Referring This Case to a Military 
Commission, United States v. Al Nashiri, Military Comm’ns Trial Judiciary, 
Guantanamo Bay Sept. 13, 2012, AE 104, [hereinafter Government Nashiri 
Response] available at http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdf/alNashiri%20II%20 
(AE104A).pdf (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the 
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As the ICTY has demonstrated, as has the U.S. Supreme 
Court in other contexts,204 an assessment of “protracted armed 
violence” requires a remarkably common form of judicial in-
quiry: the application of a multi-pronged standard to a set of 
empirical facts and circumstances in the world.205 It is certainly 
true that the Tadic test is multi-factor and complex. But the 
Court has never suggested that complex standards are perforce 
unmanageable; on the contrary, it has embraced just such “to-
tality-of-the-circumstances” measures for the purpose of deter-
mining police compliance with U.S. constitutional law.206 
What, then, might the application of the Tadic standard 
tell us about the existence of an armed conflict at the time of 
Al-Nashiri’s alleged conduct? In the U.S. Government’s estima-
tion, both the organization of the non-state group Al-Qaeda, 
and the level of hostilities by the year 2000, suffice to trigger 
the recognition of an armed conflict. Osama bin Laden began 
issuing statements “declaring war” against the United States in 
1996, publicly announcing the formation of an organization he 
called the “International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the 
Jews and the Crusaders” in 1998, and urging Muslims to kill 
Americans wherever they may find them.207 The now rich public 
literature on the nature of the Al-Qaeda organization at this 
time agrees that Al-Qaeda in the 1990’s was a highly struc-
tured organization.208 While there is no suggestion Al-Qaeda 
has ever asserted any degree of territorial control or admin-
istration, there is evidence that the group had the ability to re-
cruit and train fighters and conduct operations using military 
 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 204. See supra Part II.A.  
 205. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 
843 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming that it poses no political question and courts 
may determine whether a foreign organization has engaged in terrorist activi-
ty for purposes of meeting the statutory definition of “foreign terrorist organi-
zation”).  
 206. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (holding that 
courts should examine the totality of the circumstances in determining wheth-
er probable cause existed to obtain a warrant required by the Fourth Amend-
ment).  
 207. Government Nashiri Response, supra note 202, at 3. 
 208. See, e.g., LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND 
THE ROAD TO 9/11 131–34, 141–44 (2007).  
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weapons and tactics, and could issue and enforce internal regu-
lations and coordinate multiple units.209 
The first acts of violence the government cites in this con-
flict are Al-Qaeda’s coordinated attacks on August 7, 1998 
against U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, killing 213 people and injuring approximately 4,000 
in Nairobi, and killing 11 and wounding 85 in Dar es Salaam. 
On August 20, 1998, in response to these attacks, U.S. Armed 
Forces struck suspected Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghani-
stan and a suspected chemical weapons laboratory in Khar-
toum, Sudan.210 The attacks in which Al-Nashiri is charged 
with participating occurred a year and a half later: an attempt-
ed attack on the USS The Sullivans on January 3, 2000; and 
the successful attack on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000, 
which killed seventeen U.S. sailors, injured thirty-seven others, 
and caused significant property damage.211 While the scope and 
relatively sporadic nature of these attacks over a period of two 
years pale in comparison to the statistics the ICTY confronted 
in finding sufficient level of armed violence to recognize the ex-
istence of an armed conflict in Bosnia, relatively smaller abso-
lute numbers need not necessarily foreclose the possibility that 
an armed conflict exists.212  
Yet despite the presence of an organized enemy and multi-
ple incidents of violence preceding Al-Nashiri’s alleged war 
crimes, the government’s case for the existence of an armed 
conflict faces some substantial hurdles. During the primary pe-
riod of the indictment, alleging conduct by Al-Nashiri between 
August 1996 and October 2000, the level of actual violence be-
tween the United States and Al-Qaeda amounted to two at-
tacks in four years. The October 2000 attack on the USS Cole 
was met by the United States with only a law enforcement re-
sponse; the bombing of the U.S. Embassies in 1998 did produce 
 
 209. See id. For the relevant organizational factors, see, for example, Pros-
ecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment ¶ 884 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009); Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-
04-84-T, Judgment ¶ 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 
2008); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment ¶ 95–109 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005).  
 210. Government Nashiri Response, supra note 203. at 4. 
 211. Id.  
 212. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
55/97,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1997) (discussing the engagement of Ar-
gentina's armed forces with organized, armed militants that lasted thirty 
hours and resulted in casualties and property destruction was an armed con-
flict under international law).  
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a one-time missile strike by the United States against two sus-
pected Al-Qaeda targets, but it was also met with a series of 
criminal prosecutions of those involved.213 Throughout the peri-
od, there was no territory captured, no civilians fleeing combat 
zones, no sustained military engagement. Beyond Tadic, the 
United States remains unique among states in understanding 
the sporadic attacks of an international terrorist organization 
like Al-Qaeda as triggering an armed conflict. The vast majori-
ty of U.S. allies, the ICRC, and others have generally treated 
incidents of terrorism—particularly those incidents not tied to 
any particular territory by either the organization’s national 
affiliation, its possession of land, or the geographic locus of its 
targets—as precisely that kind of sporadic violence such as 
“banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terror-
ist activities,” the definition of “armed conflict” meant to ex-
cept.214  
What then of the attacks that followed within the year af-
ter the bombing of the USS Cole—the attacks of 9/11 them-
selves, killing 3,000 people? After those attacks, the United 
States embarked upon vast and sustained military operations 
against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, killing at least that number 
of Afghans or more in its first months of operations alone.215 
Even the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the existence of an 
armed conflict between the parties in Afghanistan after that.216 
Indeed, while the primary charges against Al-Nashiri relate to 
his role in the attack on the Cole, he is also charged with par-
ticipation in an October 2002 attack on a French oil tanker, the 
MV Limburg, resulting in the death of one person, injuries to 
twelve others, and serious damage to the tanker. The period of 
the full indictment, the government will contend, should thus 
be understood to include the hostilities between the United 
States and Al Qaeda in 2001–2002, and Al-Nashiri’s pre-2001 
conduct should be recognized as earlier salvos in what plainly 
 
 213. The United States responded to the attack on the USS Cole by sending 
a team of law enforcement agents from the FBI to Yemen to investigate; even 
when the United States became convinced several months after the attack 
that Al-Qaeda was the perpetrator, it declined to respond with military force. 
See generally ALI H. SOUFAN, THE BLACK BANNERS: THE INSIDE STORY OF 9/11 
AND THE WAR AGAINST AL-QAEDA (2011).  
 214. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment ¶ 562 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). 
 215. See Afghanistan’s Civilian Deaths Mount, BBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2002), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1740538.stm.  
 216. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 684 (2006). 
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became an armed conflict by 2001. A contrary approach—
treating the 1998 and 2000 attacks in isolation from these later 
events—risks just the kind of overly technical definition of 
“armed conflict” of which Blank and Corn warned.217  
Yet this argument, too, is not without problems. Among 
them, it is not at all clear why an attack by Al-Qaeda against a 
French vessel should be understood as evidence of the intensity 
of hostilities between Al-Qaeda and the United States (any 
more than a U.S. attack on Iran should be viewed as evidence 
of hostilities between Iran and Iraq). In any case, Blank’s and 
Corn’s concern about the dangers of undue technicality were to 
a very particular end, namely, that an unduly limited concep-
tion of “armed conflict” might result in the weakening of hu-
manitarian protections that attach once LOAC is triggered. For 
the purpose of determining war crimes liability in this context, 
however, there is no such concern. If a court were to determine 
no armed conflict existed at the time Al-Nashiri carried out his 
attacks, the effect would not be to weaken protections other-
wise available to Al-Nashiri, but rather to make clear that his 
conduct must be treated not as a war crime per se, but as an 
ordinary domestic criminal law offense. Instead of being subject 
to trial by military commission, broadly recognized to carry 
modestly weaker procedural protections for defendants that ci-
vilian criminal justice,218 Al-Nashiri would presumably be enti-
tled to the robust rights attendant criminal prosecution under 
U.S. law in the ordinary course. In this regard, one might argue 
that the definition of “armed conflict” is most consistent with 
LOAC principles if construed narrowly, to ensure that individ-
uals caught up in conflict are not stripped of more favorable 
treatment available under another applicable body of law.219  
The foregoing analysis is not intended to insist that there 
is a singular necessary resolution to the question of “armed 
conflict” in Al-Nashiri’s case. It is rather to demonstrate two 
points. First, the detailed LOAC standards for determining the 
existence of an armed conflict are both familiar in nature and 
 
 217. See Blank & Corn, supra note 189. 
 218. Brigadier Gen. Mark Martinsk Chief Prosecutor of U.S. Military 
Comm’ns, Address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Sept. 28, 
2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/09/brig-gen-mark 
-martins-address-at-chatham-house. 
 219. Cf., e.g., Geneva III, supra note 5, art. 4 (recognizing the entitlement 
of “merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the con-
flict” to prisoner-of-war protection if they “do not benefit by more favourable 
treatment under any other provisions of international law”). 
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manageable in application for courts needing to confront them. 
Indeed, the quantity of text, structure and history available to 
shed light on the meaning of “armed conflict” is at least as sub-
stantial as that available to the Court when it was faced with 
construing the rather more vague constitutional provisions at 
issue in Zivotofsky.220 While the legal standard for “armed con-
flict” requires a fact-intensive inquiry, the political question 
doctrine is designed to limit court jurisdiction not for fear that 
the courts will confront complex patterns of fact, but rather to 
disengage the courts from deciding questions in the absence of 
identifiable law. That is not the case here. Second, the preced-
ing analysis shows there are at least colorable arguments on 
both sides of the question of the existence of pre-2001 hostilities 
for the purpose of applying the MCA. As a result, how much 
weight courts afford the views of the executive (here, executive 
as prosecutor) may matter substantially in the outcome.  
B. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE 
As noted above, the AUMF authorizes the President to de-
tain individuals “engaged in an armed conflict against the 
United States,” only “for the duration of these hostilities.”221 To 
date, judicial elaboration of this standard has been driven by 
the Guantanamo habeas cases, an “overwhelming majority” of 
which “concern persons who were captured in Afghanistan, 
captured fleeing from Afghanistan, or captured in more remote 
locations where they allegedly were engaged in activities linked 
to the hostilities in Afghanistan (such as recruiting fighters to 
go there).”222 Even before U.S. operations in Afghanistan began 
more actively to wind down, the issue of when those hostilities 
were to be considered over had already begun to arise. Ghaleb 
Nassar Al-Bihani, seized in Afghanistan in late 2001, argued in 
his 2009 petition for habeas corpus, declaring that he must be 
 
 220. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1430 (2012) (citing as relevant 
text the President’s Article II power to “receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers,” and Congress’s Article I powers over naturalization and foreign 
commerce). Zivotofsky’s conclusion in this regard is notably different from that 
of the Rehnquist plurality in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–03 
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).   
 221. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 
Stat. 224, 224 (2001); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (emphasis add-
ed); see also id. at 520 (“It is a clearly established principle of the law of war 
that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.” (citing Geneva III, 
supra note 5, art. 118)); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 
2010), reh’g denied en banc, 619 F.3d 1 (2010).  
 222. Chesney, supra note 9, at 182.  
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released because the U.S. conflict with the Taliban had come to 
an end.223  
The D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Al-Bihani’s case provides a 
useful partial roadmap to how courts will be required to resolve 
the duration of the AUMF’s detention authority going forward. 
On its way to rejecting Al-Bihani’s argument that hostilities 
had ceased in 2010, the D.C. Circuit adopted the Supreme 
Court’s assumption in Hamdi that the most relevant provision 
of the Geneva Conventions was Article 118 of Geneva III, re-
quiring “release and repatriation only at the ‘cessation of active 
hostilities.’”224 Finding significance in the Conventions’ use of 
the term “active hostilities” in this context instead of “armed 
conflict,” the Court reasoned that the difference “serves to dis-
tinguish the physical violence of war from the official beginning 
and end of a conflict because fighting does not necessarily track 
formal timelines.”225 LOAC thus “codif[ies] what common sense 
tells us must be true: release is only required when the fighting 
stops.”226  
As judicially manageable standards go, this inquiry is per-
haps as clear as it gets. In Al-Bihani’s case, the Court found the 
notion that the relevant fighting had stopped in Afghanistan 
impossible to accept. Among other things: “[T]here are current-
ly 34,800 U.S. troops and a total of 71,030 Coalition troops in 
Afghanistan, with tens of thousands more to be added soon.”227 
While the Taliban had been forced out of power in 2002, the 
fighting plainly continued. Examining the factual state of af-
fairs in a way quite consistent with Tadic and the Geneva 
 
 223. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 874 (describing Al-Bihani’s argument that the 
relevant conflict had ended either when the Afghans established a post-
Taliban interim authority, when the United States recognized that authority, 
or when Hamid Karzai was elected President). 
 224. Id. (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135). The 
panel decision emphasized here, and on more than one occasion in the course 
of its opinion, that “we do not rest our resolution of this issue on international 
law or mere common sense.” Id.; see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (publishing multiple opinions addressing the panel’s treatment of 
international law). 
 225. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 874 (quoting Geneva III, art. 2 (provisions ap-
ply “even if the state of war is not recognized”) and Geneva III, art. 118 (dis-
cussing the possibility of the cessation of active hostilities even in the absence 
of an agreement to cease hostilities)). 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. (citations omitted).  
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Commentaries,228 the court’s opinion thus rejected an interpre-
tation of the law that would require the release of detained 
fighters under those circumstances.  
This is not to suggest that the application of the “cessation 
of hostilities” standard in non-international armed conflict is 
always straightforward. What if, for example, fighting between 
parties was limited to a single exchange of fire over a period of 
a year? Or, in present terms, what if Al Qaeda as an organiza-
tion had been rendered substantially incapable of conducting 
attacks against U.S. interests,229 but the United States contin-
ued to bomb alleged “Al Qaeda” targets overseas? Under such 
circumstances, the court might be required to determine 
whether there was a certain level of hostilities beneath which 
no “armed conflict” could be said to exist, falling back on the 
Tadic standard outlined in the previous section.230 The nature 
of the inquiry will undoubtedly vary according to the circum-
stances. But such variance hardly makes it judicially unman-
ageable. It makes the result a function of the application of a 
definable legal standard to varying facts.  
Indeed, the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry demon-
strates the extraordinary control the political branches retain 
over the end-of-hostilities finding—even if the courts engage in 
review. The parties’ behavior is the determinative factor. So 
long as the U.S. armed forces are a party to the conflict and 
keep shooting, the government has at least a colorable argu-
ment that hostilities continue. The legal test thus puts a heavy 
thumb on the political branches’ side of the scale. In this sense, 
the Al-Bihani court was right in later concluding that “when 
 
 228. DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 167, at 514–15 (“The expression ‘the 
close of hostilities’ should be taken to mean a state of fact rather than the legal 
situation covered by laws or decrees fixing the date of cessation of hostili-
ties.”). 
 229. See supra note 9 (quoting officials). In international armed conflict, 
the analogous circumstance is known as debellatio, when “all organized re-
sistance has disappeared,” and the enemy state “has been reduced to impo-
tence.” YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 82 (5th ed. 
2011). Debellatio is recognized as one of the modes by which international 
armed conflict may come to an end. Id. at 80.  
 230. In the one-sided-fight scenario, for example, one might argue that it is 
not possible for there to be an “armed conflict” of any kind if there are not at 
least two parties to the conflict. The effective failure of one side to fight back in 
any way suggests there is no longer a sufficiently organized force to constitute 
a party. In other wars, in other times, such a circumstance has been called de-
feat. 
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hostilities have ceased is a political decision.”231 Indeed, the Al-
Bihani opinion highlights the key difference between a political 
question and a political decision. The former forecloses the pos-
sibility that the courts may exercise jurisdiction. The latter al-
lows the courts to hold the executive to the legal results of its 
political decisions. The political branches may decide how long 
force is necessary. But once a political judgment is made to stop 
shooting, it is within the power of the courts to determine un-
der the objective standard given by law—whatever the govern-
ment subsequently says—that hostilities have come to an end.  
While Article 118 thus seems to offer judicially typical 
manageable standards, the prospect that the “hostilities” con-
templated by the AUMF describe a non-international armed 
conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda does raise an-
other legal concern: the possibility that Article 118 is not the 
relevant test for when detainees in this conflict must be re-
leased. As mentioned above, Article 118 applies by its terms on-
ly to international armed conflicts arising under the Conven-
tions. One could argue, as some scholars have, that the end of 
detention in NIACs is more appropriately understood by refer-
ence to the idea contained in the Geneva Conventions’ Addi-
tional Protocol II (APII), a treaty applicable directly to NIACs 
between states and non-state actors.232 On the question of de-
tention, Article 2 of APII provides that “[a]t the end of the 
armed conflict, all the persons who have been deprived of their 
liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related 
to such conflict, as well as those deprived of their liberty or 
whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the same rea-
sons, shall enjoy the protection of [the Protocol] until the end of 
such deprivation or restriction of liberty.”233 Because this provi-
sion does not require release, as Article 118 does, it has been 
read to suggest that detention authority may in some circum-
stances continue even after active hostilities are over as long as 
 
 231. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 874–75 (emphasis added) (quoting Ludecke v. 
Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 168–70 (1948) (“[T]ermination [of a state of war] is a 
political act.”)). 
 232. See, e.g., Bellinger & Padmanabhan, supra note 201, at 228–29; see 
also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 2124–25 (suggesting, without ref-
erence to Additional Protocol II, that whether hostilities have ceased should be 
based on a determination as to whether the individual detainee “no longer 
poses a substantial danger of rejoining hostilities” based on, for example, “the 
detainee's past conduct, level of authority within al Qaeda, statements and 
actions during confinement, age and health, and psychological profile”). 
 233. Protocol II, supra note 165, art. 2.  
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there is a security-related reason to continue.234 Indeed, a sepa-
rate passage in the Tadic decision may be seen to reaffirm this 
view, noting that “[i]nternational humanitarian law applies 
from the initiation of . . . armed conflicts and extends beyond 
the cessation of hostilities . . . in the case of internal conflicts, a 
peaceful settlement is achieved.”235 
Yet there are several problems with the notion that APII’s 
standard in this regard should guide the interpretation of the 
AUMF. First, while the United States is a party to the Third 
Geneva Convention (containing Article 118), it is not a party to 
APII. That APII is not legally binding on the United States as 
treaty law need not necessarily be dispositive. The United 
States has submitted APII for ratification, so is required at a 
minimum not to undermine its object and purpose.236 Moreover, 
the ICRC contends that the restriction on detention in NIACs 
is the same under customary international law (to which the 
United States is bound whether a signatory to the treaty or 
not) as under APII.237 At the same time, the methodology of the 
ICRC’s customary international law study has been subject to 
strong criticism by the United States and others.238  
 
 234. See, e.g., DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 167, at 1360 (noting that the 
parties had rejected an amendment to the Protocol that would have required 
its application cease “upon the general cessation of military operations”); id. at 
1359 (“In principle, measures restricting people's liberty, taken for reasons re-
lated to the conflict, should cease at the end of active hostilities, i.e., when mil-
itary operations have ceased, except in cases of penal convictions. Neverthe-
less, if such measures were maintained with regard to some persons for 
security reasons, or if the victorious party were making arrests in order to re-
store public order and secure its authority, legal protection would continue to 
be necessary for those against whom such actions were taken.”); JEAN-MARIE 
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 451 (2005) 
(“Persons deprived of their liberty in relation to a non-international armed 
conflict must be released as soon as the reasons for the deprivation of their 
liberty cease to exist.”); id. at 452 (“Refusal to release detainees when the rea-
son for their detention has ceased to exist would violate the prohibition of ar-
bitrary deprivation of liberty . . . .”). 
 235. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 236. See Message from President Ronald Reagan, Transmitting Additional 
Protocol II to the U.S. Senate for Ratification (Jan. 29, 1987), http://www.loc 
.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/protocol-II-100-2.pdf.  
 237. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 234, at 451.  
 238. See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 
2007).  
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Perhaps more important, ICRC’s statement of the custom-
ary international law principle in the case of NIAC detention is 
centrally concerned not with legal support for prolonged deten-
tion authority, but with preventing unjustified delays in re-
lease.239 It is for a related reason that one should be suspicious 
of the notion that APII, Article 2 should be read to authorize 
extended detention in the first place. Article 2 is concerned cen-
trally with ensuring the continued application of humanitarian 
protection for as long as possible—whatever the underlying de-
tention scheme applicable in a particular NIAC. API, Article 
75(6), applicable in IACs, contains an analogous provision.240 
Yet no one reads this regulation of IAC law as in tension with 
or in any sense overriding the parallel requirement in IAC (in 
GCIII, Art. 118), that prisoners be released upon the cessation 
of hostilities. Rather, in both IAC and NIAC provisions on this 
point, the rule is best understood as intended only to extend as 
far as possible the application of humanitarian safeguards in 
detention—all unrelated to the separate question of when de-
tention is legally required to end, a question that, in NIAC in 
particular, is likely to be resolved in the first instance by do-
mestic law.241  
A further reason the APII argument is problematic is also 
related to its applicability. To the extent the argument in favor 
of relying on the law of APII is that the conflict authorized by 
the AUMF is more like a NIAC than an IAC, it is worth noting 
that neither the classic IAC model (contemplating conflicts be-
tween two states), nor the NIAC model (contemplating conflicts 
internal to a single state) actually reflects the unusual nature 
of the conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda—a 
trans-border conflict between a state and a non-state actor. In-
deed, it is in part for this reason that the United States is 
 
 239. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 234, at 451 (“The United 
Nations and other international organizations have on various occasions high-
lighted the importance of the release of detainees held in connection with non-
international armed conflicts . . . .”).  
 240. Protocol I, supra note 165, at 38 (“Persons who are arrested, detained 
or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict shall enjoy the protection 
provided by this Article until their final release, repatriation or re-
establishment, even after the end of the armed conflict.”).  
 241. The same argument explains the effect of the Tadic court’s statement 
that international humanitarian law applies beyond the cessation of hostili-
ties. It is one thing to insist, as the court does, that humanitarian protections 
last as long as possible, until a peaceful settlement is achieved. It would be 
another thing to hold that LOAC allows, much less authorizes, detention until 
this point. 
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largely alone in the world in describing the violence between it 
and Al Qaeda as an “armed conflict” of any kind. 
Finally, and most important, APII can be read to stand at 
most for the proposition that NIAC law does not prohibit deten-
tion beyond the cessation of hostilities. This is far from the 
same thing as a claim that APII itself somehow authorizes such 
detention. The United States has consistently rejected the idea 
that international law may serve as a source of authority en-
larging government power beyond that authorized by our own 
Constitution or laws.242 Indeed, APII rules are based on the as-
sumption that the primary law regulating intra-state conflicts 
would remain the law of the state in which the conflict oc-
curred.243 To understand which standard—GCIII, Article 118 or 
APII, Article 2—best applies here, one must ask which is most 
consistent with the meaning of the domestic law authorizing 
the power—in this case, the AUMF.  
Here, there are several reasons to think the IAC standard 
is the best reading of the AUMF. Congress’s most immediate 
focus in enacting the AUMF was the pending invasion by the 
United States of Afghanistan, for the stated purpose of ridding 
that country of a government that had harbored Al Qaeda.244 
Shortly after the passage of the AUMF, the invasion happened. 
And the United States entered into an IAC in the classic 
sense—an armed conflict between two state parties to the Ge-
neva Conventions. Further, the notion that what Congress 
meant to authorize was instead a NIAC between the United 
States and Al Qaeda—or perhaps an IAC with Afghanistan and 
a broader NIAC with the terrorist organization worldwide—
raises far more concerns under international law. The notion 
that a conflict between a state and a terrorist organization 
might rise to the level of an “armed conflict” covered by LOAC 
is a novel interpretation of international law, one that has not 
gained acceptance by the ICRC or by other state parties to the 
 
 242. See Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759 (2008); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 
(1957); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).  
 243. To the extent the ongoing NIAC in which the United States is involved 
is one between it and non-state actors in Afghanistan, it was most properly 
Afghan law, not U.S. law, which should have been recognized as the key 
source of law authorizing the continued detention of those picked up in the 
course of that conflict now at Guantanamo.  
 244. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(“There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States 
in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have support-
ed the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individu-
als Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF.”).  
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Conventions. Longstanding canons of construction requiring 
the Court to favor interpretations of ambiguous statutes that 
are more, rather than less, consistent with international law 
would thus also tend to favor the IAC interpretation here.245  
In this respect, it is of no small matter that both the D.C. 
Circuit and the Supreme Court have now held that the AUMF 
is informed by Article 118,246 a conclusion that Congress even in 
subsequent legislation has done nothing to dispel.247 Precisely 
to avoid interpreting the scope of the AUMF in a way that 
might raise broader legal concerns, the courts have embraced 
the view that the detention authority granted by Congress was 
not meant to be unlimited, but was intended to be cabined by 
this particular “longstanding principle” of the law of war.248 In 
all events, just as the Court did in Hamdi, the choice of which 
provision of international law best informs the meaning of the 
AUMF is a classic question of statutory interpretation for the 
courts. 
C. TEXTUAL COMMITMENTS 
However manageable the standards available for discern-
ing the existence of war may be, there remains the outstanding 
central element of political question doctrine that requires con-
sidering: whether the U.S. Constitution textually commits the 
inquiry into the existence of hostilities to one of the political 
branches. While the Court’s historical resolution of such ques-
tions would seem to foreclose such an argument, it is worth 
briefly contemplating here. 
In the MCA context, the strongest argument that an aspect 
of the statute’s meaning is textually committed to another 
branch is the Article I provision allocating to Congress the 
power to “define and punish . . . offenses against the law of na-
 
 245. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804). 
 246. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507; Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 874–
75 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 247. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 
Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298. 
 248. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (“[W]e understand Congress’s grant of au-
thority for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include the authority 
to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is 
based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If the practical circumstances of 
a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the de-
velopment of the law of war, that understanding may unravel. But that is not 
the situation we face as of this date. Active combat operations against Taliban 
fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan.”).  
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tions.”249 To the extent the existence of an “armed conflict” is an 
element of a military commission offense, one might argue that 
defining the scope and nature of those hostilities is part and 
parcel of Congress’s power to define the offense. While the 
meaning of the Define and Punish Clause is, to say the least, 
contested,250 at least one federal judge has embraced the view 
that Congress’s power in this respect is substantial, and not 
limited by international law.251  
The problems with this argument are severalfold. For one, 
as explained above, the question of the existence of hostilities 
in the MCA arises both as an element of the offense, and in 
connection with the jurisdiction of the commissions in the first 
instance. While Congress may have a special claim to defining 
the offenses established pursuant to its power under that 
Clause, it is difficult to see how the Clause could give Congress 
sole textual claim to the jurisdictional question—that is, to de-
ciding whether commissions are constitutionally permitted as 
to a particular offender at all. The Court in Hamdan certainly 
gave no indication that this was the case in its study of com-
mission jurisdiction.252 Indeed, as scholars have long pointed 
out, giving Congress unfettered (unreviewable) power to create 
or expand the jurisdiction of non-Article III courts would pose a 
fundamental challenge to the Constitution’s separation-of-
powers scheme. In Richard Fallon’s account: “[C]onstitutional 
principles must be derived to circumscribe the role of legislative 
courts, or else the functions of the article III judiciary could, at 
Congress’s option, be all but obliterated.”253 
 
 249. The Define and Punish Clause provides that Congress has the power 
“to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and 
Offences against the Law of Nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 250. See also, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause 
and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149 (2009); Beth 
Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power To “Define and 
Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447 
(2000). Compare Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1247 n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (arguing the Define and Punish Clause is not limited by international 
law), with Vladeck, supra note 159, at 295 (discussing Define and Punish 
Clause).  
 251. See Hamdan, 696 F.3d at 1247 n. 6 (“Congress’s war powers under Ar-
ticle I are not defined or constrained by international law.”). 
 252. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 253. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, 
and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 923 (1988) (citing Northern Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 73–74 (1982)).  
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In any case, even if Congress’s power under the Define and 
Punish Clause affords it exclusive power to define offenses as 
war crimes, there is no reason to assume that in allocating to 
Congress this power, the Constitution meant thereby to deprive 
the courts of their Article III power to review the legality of tri-
als and convictions of those offenses, much less of their power 
to construe the statutory meaning of the offenses Congress de-
fines. Just as the Court has not hesitated to decide whether 
Congress has by statute invoked its Article I power to suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus,254 so too the Court must be able to in-
terpret statutes invoking Congress’s Article I power to define 
and punish offenses against the law of war. 
In contrast, the argument that the scope of the hostilities 
authorized by the AUMF is textually committed to Congress 
likely turns first on Congress’s Article I power to “declare 
war.”255 Whether or not expressly invoked in particular legisla-
tion, one might imagine a reading of the Declare War Clause 
that would give Congress exclusive power to say whether “war” 
exists. It would, after all, seem ludicrous to suggest that the 
federal courts could, for example, constitutionally “declare war” 
in the sense of initiating a conflict with another nation or 
group.  
Yet recognizing that Congress holds the exclusive power to 
declare war does not necessarily deprive the courts of otherwise 
extant Article III power to interpret a statute describing the 
scope of the war Congress has declared, or even taking notice of 
a condition in which the country is or is not at war. Indeed, a 
contrary reading of the Declare War Clause would seem flatly 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s treatment of the ques-
tion in, among others, The Prize Cases, in which it explained 
that a civil war in particular was “never publicly proclaimed,” 
but was rather “a fact in our domestic history which the Court 
is bound to notice and to know.” 256 Here, the statutory question 
in the AUMF context is not whether war has begun but rather 
whether the “hostilities” Congress has authorized continue to 
exist. At least as a matter of textual commitment of power un-
der the Constitution, there seems no difference between the 
 
 254. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 420 (2000) (interpreting AEDPA).  
 255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
 256. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667 (1863); see also Matthews 
v. McStea, 91 U.S. 7 (1875); Neustra Senora de la Caridad, 17 U.S. 497, 502 
(1819).  
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power to resolve the question in one direction and the power to 
resolve it in another. 
III.  BEYOND THE DOCTRINE   
In one sense, the conclusion that the existence-of-war con-
ditions in the MCA and AUMF are not political questions flows 
unremarkably from the existence of a law of armed conflict. A 
body of law that has in some form existed for centuries, its rap-
id growth following World War II, led in large measure by polit-
ical leaders of the United States,  reflected a commitment to 
the idea that law should constrain the conduct of war, whether 
the war was between nation states or between a state and a 
non-state organization. State parties to the Conventions thus 
embraced a singular bargain: individuals who would in any 
other circumstance be prosecuted for murder for the act of kill-
ing would be relieved of this liability, provided they satisfied 
standards for being a “privileged” fighter, and provided they 
abided by a set of rules in the exceptional circumstance in 
which a dispute among parties rose to the level of “armed con-
flict.”257 Because the consequences of triggering LOAC were so 
stark—allowing killing by a class of privileged combatants 
where it would otherwise be murder—the law required that 
there be a meaningful, legal distinction between a state of war 
and a state of peace. The notion that it is impossible to distin-
guish legally between the state of affairs in which killing may 
be lawful, and the state of affairs in which it is not, is anathe-
ma to LOAC’s central scheme.  
The conclusion is likewise consistent with U.S. legal tradi-
tions, particularly courts’ historical insistence, even in the face 
of executive opposition, that they determine for themselves 
whether war exists.258 This has been expressly true in the con-
text implicated by the MCA: whether criminal military jurisdic-
tion exists and what criminal punishment may be affixed.259 
The reasons for judicial engagement in such cases seem readily 
understandable. As the Court and scholars have long recog-
nized, political question doctrine is best understood as a func-
 
 257. Johnson, supra note 9 (“‘War’ must be regarded as a finite, extraordi-
nary and unnatural state of affairs. War permits one man—if he is a ‘privi-
leged belligerent,’ consistent with the laws of war—to kill another.”).  
 258. See supra Part II.A. 
 259. See supra Part I.A (citing, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Lee 
v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959)).  
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tion of the separation-of-powers interests it serves,260 interests 
that begin with the protection of individual liberty.261 Individu-
al rights are acutely implicated in matters of criminal justice; 
fully half of the Bill of Rights is devoted to establishing process 
constraints on the government’s power in the application of 
criminal law, including the right to trial by jury.262 It is difficult 
to imagine how many of these rights could be protected if courts 
could opt out of the process of criminal justice that the Consti-
tution commits to judicial supervision.  
Indeed, because the existence of hostilities under the MCA 
is not only a question of jurisdiction, but also an element of a 
charging offense in commission prosecutions, the Constitution 
requires that the government prove their existence to a com-
mission jury beyond a reasonable doubt.263 In the context of a 
standard criminal prosecution in particular, the Constitution 
insists that an independent jury, not the executive, serve as a 
neutral finder of fact. Ceding to the executive the effective pow-
er to determine the presence of this circumstance would pre-
sent a grave constitutional question, effectively relieving the 
prosecuting power of its obligation to prove a key element of the 
defendant’s guilt. 
Yet if the separation-of-powers interest in protecting indi-
vidual rights weighs heavily against less than full-throated 
participation by the judicial branch on the question when 
 
 260. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). For a more detailed 
discussion of the functional separation-of-powers interests at stake in defer-
ence doctrines, see, for example, Pearlstein, supra note 24, at 1573.  
 261. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165–66 (1803); see also 
Pearlstein, supra note 14, at 1573 (citing Bruce Ackerman, The New Separa-
tion of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 715–27 (2000)) (discussing interests the 
separation of powers protects); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? 
The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 323–30 (2002) (defending some form of political ques-
tion doctrine on grounds of promoting accountability); Pearlstein, supra note 
26, at 820–25, 836.  
 262. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (public trial), IV–VI, VIII. 
 263. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (declaring that a 
criminal defendant is entitled to “a jury determination that [he] is guilty of 
every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable 
doubt”) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)) (citing 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993)); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime with which he is charged.”). This is indeed how the question 
was treated when it arose in the prosecution of Salim Hamdan for material 
support to Al Qaeda. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1278 
(C.M.C.R. 2011).  
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armed conflict begins, what of the similarly fact-intensive in-
quiry at hostilities’ end? Individual rights are equally implicat-
ed in, for example, the long-term detention of prisoners carried 
out under AUMF authority. But to what extent would a court 
really be willing to find that hostilities were over—even in the 
face of, for example, a presidential statement that hostilities 
persist? After all, earlier formulations of political question doc-
trine included consideration not only of the Constitution’s tex-
tual commitment of a question to another branch of govern-
ment, and the availability of judicially manageable standards, 
but also of the concern that the Court not express a lack of re-
spect to its coordinate branches of government, and recognize 
when there might be an unusual need for finality in a political 
decision already made.264  
More important, separation-of-powers interests have never 
been thought limited to the protection of individual rights. As 
the Court and scholars have variously recognized, they also in-
clude the maintenance of democratic accountability, and, in 
contrast to the Articles of Confederation regime the Constitu-
tion replaced, the promotion of governmental effectiveness.265 
The political question doctrine emerged largely as a narrow ex-
ception to the presumption in favor of judicial engagement to 
serve these other two goals.266 So, for example, where effective-
ness in foreign policy might require that the Government speak 
with one voice in international relations, the political branches’ 
superior electoral accountability favors the President (or even 
 
 264. See supra Part I.B (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). Indeed, 
Munaf v. Geren may be read to suggest that concerns of avoiding inter-branch 
embarrassment may still matter to an extent. 553 U.S. 674, 702–03 (2008). 
 265. See, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 24, at 1573 (citing Ackerman, supra 
note 260, at 715–27) (discussing interests the separation of powers protects)); 
see also Barkow, supra note 260, at 323–30 (defending some form of political 
question doctrine on grounds of promoting accountability); Pearlstein, supra 
note 26, at 799, 809, 811–12, 817–21.  
 266. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165–66 (1803) (“By the Constitution 
of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political 
powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is ac-
countable only to his country in his political character, and to his own con-
science. . . . [W]hatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which 
executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to 
control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not 
individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the ex-
ecutive is conclusive.”).  
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Congress) over the Court as the voice to do it.267 Particularly 
where the question implicates the President’s power to target 
or detain individuals he maintains continue to plan attacks 
against the United States, it seems a direct challenge to these 
interests for the Court to insist on second-guessing the execu-
tive’s assessment of the nature of the conflict. 
Here, it is helpful to recall that judicial engagement in law 
interpretation has never been limited to an on/off switch, one 
position where jurisdiction exists and independent decision-
making follows, another position in which no jurisdiction exists, 
and the courts are therefore silent. Rather, the political ques-
tion doctrine is best viewed as on one end of a continuum of 
mechanisms by which the courts tailor their interpretive role to 
recognize the varied separation-of-powers interests that shape 
the Court’s power.268 If the political question end of the contin-
uum reflects a judgment that some separation-of-powers inter-
ests prohibit judicial engagement at all, and at the other end is 
the pursuit of full-throated independent judicial review, in the 
middle are various doctrines of judicial deference, in which the 
views of the executive are afforded more or less dispositive 
weight in interpretation.269 It is among these options one finds, 
for example, what Robert Chesney has called “national security 
fact deference”—a mode of review in which the executive’s su-
perior expertise and access to information, its need to protect 
operational security and efficiency, and its direct accountability 
to the voters, are said to justify the executive’s demand that the 
Court defer to its findings of fact.270 Indeed, our system vests all 
kinds of fact-finders—from juries to administrative agencies—
with enormous authority to determine facts with severe conse-
quences for individual rights. That the Commander-in-Chief 
 
 267. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702–03 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 279 
(James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)) (“If we are to be one nation in any re-
spect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.” (citations omitted)).  
 268. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (describing political question doctrine as 
“primarily a function of the separation of powers”); Rachel E. Barkow, The 
Rise and Fall of the Political Question Doctrine, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Nada Mourtada-
Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007). 
 269. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum 
of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations 
from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (describing a continuum of 
judicial deference regimes to executive branch interpretation) (citing, e.g., 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)). 
 270. Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 
1361 (2009). 
PEARLSTEIN_4fmt 11/6/2014 4:13 PM 
210 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:143 
 
should be entitled to deference on the essentially factual ques-
tion whether hostilities exist seems, in the scope of our system, 
a rather less challenging allocation than many. 
Yet as the following discussion shows, it is far from clear 
that deference to the executive on the existence of hostilities in 
these contexts invariably advances any of the separation-of-
powers purposes just named. Assuming that individual rights 
under the AUMF and MCA are better served by judicial en-
gagement, this Part focuses in particular on the interests in 
promoting political accountability and government effective-
ness. It examines how such interests are or are not served by 
deferring to executive interpretation of existence-of-war condi-
tions in the MCA and AUMF, and argues that just as the Court 
has developed varied regimes and degrees of deference depend-
ing on the subject and nature of the judicial inquiry, it should 
tailor the degree of deference given based on the extent to 
which it serves the interests separating powers were meant to 
advance.  
A. ACCOUNTABILITY 
The expectation that it is the job of the electorate to hold 
political actors accountable for certain kinds of decision-making 
is a core animating principle of political question doctrine.271 
Not only in the context of war-making, but throughout admin-
istrative law, the notion that the executive is better positioned 
in this respect to resolve uncertainties in statutory interpreta-
tion is central. As the Court put it perhaps most famously: 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of 
the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the compet-
ing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not re-
solve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with 
the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.272 
That the President is elected and the justices are not is be-
yond dispute. But would denying the courts the power to con-
duct a de novo inquiry into the existence of hostilities really 
serve the interests of accountability at stake in applying the 
MCA and AUMF? 
 
 271. See Barkow, supra note 260, at 323–30 (defending some form of politi-
cal question doctrine on grounds of promoting accountability).  
 272. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
865–66 (1984). 
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The argument that simple deference to the executive’s view 
of when hostilities begin best serves political accountability 
fails for several reasons. First, the notion that the executive is 
substantially more politically accountable than the courts may 
be especially questionable in the national security context.273 
Whereas in other realms of administrative law it may be plau-
sible to argue that major executive agency decisions will enjoy 
“the kind of public scrutiny that is essential in any democra-
cy,”274 appropriate government interests in secrecy surrounding 
certain aspects of security may make it impossible for political 
accountability checks to function effectively. That is, because 
security sometimes requires secrecy, the involvement of multi-
ple branches may be required to make accountability possible 
at all.  
Second, it is too facile to assume that judicial involvement 
in the determination of the existence of hostilities somehow de-
prives the political branches of the ability to exercise authority 
they, as the most politically accountable branches, are most in-
stitutionally suited to exercise. Congress could readily have 
written statutes that made the condition of their operation de-
pendent on the existence of a political trigger (a presidential 
proclamation, for example), rather than a factual one. Congress 
has certainly written such authorizations in the past.275 Yet nei-
ther the MCA nor the AUMF is such a statute. Both laws make 
their operation dependent on the application of an external 
body of law, which self-consciously requires an objective deter-
mination of whether hostilities exist. Congress and the Presi-
dent’s decisions to embrace this legislative scheme took place in 
full view of the electorate. Such decisions are surely within the 
competence of the political branches to make.  
Indeed, there is reason to imagine that Congress and the 
President wanted to leave key questions of detention and trial 
to the courts to resolve because judicial engagement could make 
 
 273. Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations 
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1246 n.58 (2007); Pearlstein, supra note 24, at 1577–
78. 
 274. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190–91 
(2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–32 (2001) (“Presidential administration pro-
motes accountability in two principal and related ways. First, presidential 
leadership enhances transparency, enabling the public to comprehend more 
accurately the sources and nature of bureaucratic power. Second, presidential 
leadership establishes an electoral link between the public and the bureaucra-
cy . . . .”). 
 275. See supra Part II.A. 
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it easier for the political branches to avoid electoral accounta-
bility for security decision-making.276 Political scientists have 
long noted that Congress has tended to shirk decision-making 
responsibility on questions of the use of force, effectively ceding 
key questions of force to executive control in the interest of 
avoiding the political cost of engagement.277 Recent scholarship 
has persuasively demonstrated how the executive, too, has in 
some instances relied on judicial involvement to avoid taking 
direct public responsibility for its foreign policy goals.278 Such 
behavior is in striking contrast to the framers’ expectation that 
the branches would seek to enlarge their control, and that 
checks on power must be established in order to counteract 
such natural institutional ambition.279 But where, as here, the 
 
 276. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S8632, S8658 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Feinstein) (explaining the import of her proposed, later 
adopted, amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act, and describ-
ing the agreed-upon amendment as “preserv[ing] current law for the three 
groups specified, as interpreted by our Federal courts, and to leave to the 
courts the difficult questions of who may be detained by the military, for how 
long, and under what circumstances”); 157 CONG. REC. S8094, S8124 (daily ed. 
Dec. 11, 2011) (statement of Sen. Durbin on same amendment) (“[T]he latter 
amendment . . . makes it clear that this bill does not change existing detention 
authority in any way. It means the Supreme Court will ultimately decide who 
can and cannot be detained indefinitely without a trial. . . . The Supreme 
Court will decide who will be detained; the Senate will not.”).  
 277. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITU-
TION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 123–33 (1990); 
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE 
UNFULFILLED 161–75 (1985). 
 278. David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 145 (2008) (detailing how the George Washington Administra-
tion “chose to defer to the Judicial Branch and allow judicial decision making 
in the privateering cases to guide the implementation of U.S. neutrality poli-
cy”). In this context, consider President Obama’s early speech on the necessity 
of closing Guantanamo detention facilities. See President Obama, Remarks by 
the President on National Security (May 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national 
-security-5-21-09 (“The third category of detainees includes those who have 
been ordered released by the courts. . . . This has nothing to do with my deci-
sion to close Guantanamo. It has to do with the rule of law. The courts have 
spoken. They have found that there's no legitimate reason to hold 21 of the 
people currently held at Guantanamo. Nineteen of these findings took place 
before I was sworn into office. I cannot ignore these rulings because as Presi-
dent, I too am bound by the law. The United States is a nation of laws and so 
we must abide by these rulings.”). 
 279. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961) (“[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the 
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who admin-
ister each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal mo-
tives, to resist encroachments of the others.”). 
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Constitution allocates both Congress and the President sub-
stantial roles in regulating the use of force, and where shirking 
pathologies make it more difficult for the public to hold elected 
officials accountable for use of force decisions, judicial interpre-
tation may be especially valuable. Particularly where there is 
evidence of such political process failure, robust judicial en-
gagement may force the disgorgement of legal and factual find-
ings from the executive otherwise inappropriately withheld, 
better informing public deliberation. And if the Court miscon-
strues one or the other statutory command, Congress may have 
new incentive to engage in difficult policy decision-making. In 
this respect, if the authority Congress has granted in the MCA 
or AUMF does not clearly afford the President the power he 
seeks to assert, the Court can promote democratic deliberation 
by saying so.  
Finally, it bears returning to a point made above for the 
purpose of understanding why the political branches may have 
made the decision they did. The decision to make the duration 
of statutory authorities turn substantially on the existence of 
hostilities vel non in practical operation gives the political 
branches an extraordinary degree of control, especially over the 
end of the war. So long as the U.S. armed forces keep shooting, 
the government has at least a colorable argument that hostili-
ties continue. But once the political judgment is made to stop 
shooting, it is within the power of the courts to determine—
whatever the government subsequently says—that hostilities 
have come to an end. In effect, all allowing the courts to adjudi-
cate these issues accomplishes is that the courts are able to 
hold the government to the legal consequences of the political 
decisions already made. Active judicial engagement in these ex-
istence-of-hostilities questions thus facilitates political ac-
countability in the most direct sense.  
B. EFFECTIVENESS 
There is little question that the Constitution’s framers, Al-
exander Hamilton above all, believed that however the new 
government was designed, it should address the inadequacy of 
the Articles of Confederation government in being capable of 
effectively repelling a foreign attack.280 The notion that there 
should be a “unitary executive,” rather than a committee body 
 
 280. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac 
Kramnick ed., 1987) (“Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggres-
sion? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor government.”). 
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in the executive, was among the results of this imperative.281 At 
the same time, Hamilton’s goal of “good government” applied 
equally to all branches and every sector of government af-
fairs.282 It has thus been in a wide variety of settings that the 
Court has attended in its decision making to the perceived effi-
cacy of a given separation-of-powers outcome. That is, by con-
sidering whether it is necessary to alter the usual distribution 
of powers among the branches in order to make a legitimate 
mission of government work.283 Where an executive agency en-
 
 281. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 
1725, 1786 (1996) (“The advocates of [a unitary executive] prevailed over noisy 
opposition—primarily with the argument that a single magistrate would give 
the most ‘energy’ . . . .” (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, at 65 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (James Wilson) (June 1))); see 
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick 
ed., 1987) (“Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of 
good government.”); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 768, at 546 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 
Carolina Acad. Press 1987) (1833) (“Of all the cases and concerns of govern-
ment, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities, which dis-
tinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”). 
 282. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac 
Kramnick ed., 1987); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 243 (James Madi-
son) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“Energy in government is essential to that 
security against external and internal danger and to that prompt and salutary 
execution of the laws which enter into the very definition of good govern-
ment.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac 
Kramnick ed., 1987) (“[C]onfidence in and obedience to a government will 
commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration.”). 
 283. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 
847, 856 (1986) (“[T]he constitutionality of a given congressional delegation of 
adjudicative functions to a non-Article III body must be assessed by reference 
to the purposes underlying the requirements of Article III. . . . It was only to 
ensure the effectiveness of [the regulatory] scheme that Congress authorized 
the CFTC to assert jurisdiction over common law counterclaims. Indeed . . . 
absent the CFTC’s exercise of that authority, the purposes of the reparations 
procedure would have been confounded.”); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 
763, 779 (1950) (opining that habeas hearings “would hamper the war effort 
and bring aid and comfort to the enemy [and] . . . would diminish the prestige 
of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals”); see 
also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769 (2008) (“The Government pre-
sents no credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would 
be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ 
claims.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (“We think it unlikely 
that this basic process will have the dire impact on the central functions of 
warmaking that the Government forecasts.”); id. at 535 (“What are the allow-
able limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been over-
stepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.” (quoting Sterling v. 
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932)); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 
290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“[T]he war power . . . is a power to wage war success-
fully . . . .”)).  
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joys special expertise in a subject area, or unique access to in-
formation, or where secrecy may be thought essential to protect 
operational security or efficiency, judicial deference might be 
thought essential for effectiveness.284  
Is deference to the executive on the existence of hostilities 
necessary to make the legitimate aims of the MCA and AUMF 
effective? Consider first the MCA. The existence of hostilities 
for purposes of military commission jurisdiction turns on 
Tadic’s two-factor test: protracted armed violence, and a suffi-
ciently organized armed group as a party to the conflict. While 
there is likely little dispute over Al Qaeda’s relative organiza-
tional sophistication at the time of the bombing of the USS 
Cole,285 there is much dispute as to whether the intensity of vio-
lence in the year 2000 rose to the level of an “armed conflict,” as 
distinct from criminal activity or terrorism.286 In making the 
distinction, the Tadic court considered not just whether the 
government was obliged to use military (not just police) force in 
response to the violence, but more the number, duration, and 
intensity of individual confrontations; the types of weapons 
used; the number and types of forces engaged in the fighting; 
the geographic and temporal distribution of clashes; any terri-
tory captured or material destruction; refugees fleeing combat; 
and any casualties suffered.  
In evaluating these factors, the executive surely has sever-
al functional advantages. It enjoys first and most direct access 
to information about the number of strikes it has ordered, the 
types of forces and weapons engaged in the fighting, and the 
pattern of clashes. While it may have incomplete information 
about the tactics pursued and casualties sustained by the ene-
my, it enjoys significant expertise in estimating the likely ef-
fects of weapons on casualties and property loss, and in any 
case has manifestly better access to such insights than do the 
courts. Above all, the executive is in sole possession of infor-
mation—about, for example, the extent and nature of the gov-
ernment response or attacks still being planned by either par-
ty—that it may have powerful operational interests in keeping 
secret. 
 
 284. See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702–03 (2008) (discussing ju-
dicial deference to the political branches in the context of transferring detain-
ees to Iraq). 
 285. See WRIGHT, supra note 207, at 318–20. 
 286. See supra Part II.A.3.  
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Without doubting that the executive enjoys superior access 
to information, it is not immediately apparent why access alone 
necessarily requires restricting the ordinary function of the 
court. Typically, parties before a court are required to disgorge 
what information they have—through processes of discovery, 
record-making, and the like—in order to aid judicial decision 
making. To the extent expert estimates offer the best infor-
mation available, they have likewise regularly been subject to 
discovery and judicial evaluation across a vast array of complex 
fields. More, unlike the fact deference the Munaf Court seemed 
inclined to show on the question of the likelihood of torture up-
on transfer of custody,287 here there is no predictive or discre-
tionary judgment involved. The relevant period of inquiry is 
that covered by the allegations in the indictment regarding 
past events; the court is not required to anticipate whether 
fighting will (much less should) continue.  
More complex might be a circumstance in which the execu-
tive has some legitimate claim to resisting discovery in order to 
keep information secret, as in the context of ongoing fighting 
imagined above. But such interests seem unlikely to be at stake 
in the criminal prosecutions authorized by the MCA. The in-
quiry into the existence of hostilities there is retrospective in 
nature—whether hostilities existed during the period of the 
acts alleged to be part of the charging offenses. By definition, 
any operational exigency inherent in those events has passed. 
A retrospective legal determination of the start date of war 
likewise imposes non-apparent costs on strategic decision mak-
ing in a conflict ongoing. It need not affect how (or whether) the 
government engages in current war-fighting, and it does not 
limit current battlefield choices. In any case, the practical pos-
sibility of sustained secrecy in such circumstances is limited. 
Particularly because there must be demonstration of some de-
gree of personal and material destruction of at least one organ-
izational party outside the executive branch, many such events 
are, to a great extent, public facts in our “history which the 
Court is bound to notice and to know.”288  
 
 287. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702–03; accord El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. 
United States, 607 F.3d 836, 843–44 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (emphasizing that while 
it posed no political question for a court to determine whether a foreign organ-
ization had engaged in terrorist activity, it would pose such a question to de-
termine whether that activity “threatens the . . . security of the United States” 
(quoting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1189(a)(1)(C) (2012))).  
 288. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667–69 (1863). Indeed, the 
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In some contrast, consider the position of, for example, a 
Guantanamo detainee arguing in 2015 that the AUMF no long-
er authorizes his detention because hostilities with the Taliban 
and Al Qaeda have come to an end. Assume he is able to argue 
based on judicially noticeable information that U.S. combat 
troops have left Afghanistan, and there have been no (or a 
glancing number of) attacks by Al Qaeda or its co-belligerents 
against the United States or its interests. Hostilities, he ar-
gues, are thus not intense enough to constitute an armed con-
flict. He will likewise point to government officials’ public 
statements about the organizational deterioration of core Al 
Qaeda, and that group’s inability to exercise effective command 
over its constituent parts.  
As with the MCA, the existence of hostilities in the AUMF 
context is largely a question about actual events in the world, 
and in this sense a discoverable set of facts. The inquiry is not 
retrospective in nature, but neither does it require predictive 
judgment—it is about what currently is. At the same time, the 
inquiry involves a set of facts to which the executive may, un-
der some circumstances, wish to preserve special access. If the 
government’s position is that hostilities continue, it may well 
wish to maintain secrecy about attacks one or both sides 
planned but were not successful—or not yet successful—in car-
rying out.289 Or, the executive might concede that there have 
 
Court has regularly engaged in its own detailed factual analysis about condi-
tions of war. See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 299–300, 301 
(1918) (“It appears in the record, and is a matter of general history, that . . . 
General Carranza . . . inaugurated a revolution against the claimed authority 
of Huerta and . . . proclaimed the organization of a constitutional government . 
. . and that civil war was at once entered upon between the followers and forc-
es of the two leaders.”); The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 63–66 (1897); cf. Mat-
thews v. McStea, 91 U.S. 7, 11 (1875) (recognizing that war may exist whether 
or not declared, and finding that “[h]ostilities had commenced” and a state of 
war existed before a presidential proclamation declaring a blockade of the 
South); The Neustra Senora de la Caridad, 17 U.S. 497, 502 (1819) (“War no-
toriously exists . . . .”).  
 289. While a more legally problematic practice, the government may like-
wise wish to retain the ability to deny official involvement in ongoing conflicts. 
Cf. Earth Pledge Found. v. CIA, 988 F. Supp. 623, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ex-
plaining that official confirmation of a CIA field station in the Dominican Re-
public could cause a disruption of foreign relations because “countries are will-
ing to tolerate the presence of CIA installations in their country only if the 
United States does not officially acknowledge that such stations exist”). Many 
public reports reveal the use of U.S. drones against targets in Pakistan, for 
example, but the U.S. government has insisted upon the importance of not on-
ly operational secrecy but also diplomatic deniability in its drone program; on-
ly the U.S. government thus has full information on the extent of the use of 
PEARLSTEIN_4fmt 11/6/2014 4:13 PM 
218 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:143 
 
been few or no successful attacks against the United States by 
the other party, but argue the reason that no attacks have been 
successful is not because they have ceased to be launched, but 
because U.S. forces have been effective—using sources or 
methods it would like to preserve the ability to use in secret—
in repelling those attacks before they are complete. While it 
may be that the application of law to fact required for resolving 
the AUMF question is, broadly speaking, justiciable, the execu-
tive’s claim to effectiveness-based fact deference here is strong-
er.  
Yet even here, it is not apparent that effectiveness per se 
requires categorical deference to the executive’s factual asser-
tions. The lessons of administrative law, organization theory, 
and a host of related fields suggest that it is not only possible, 
but wise, to impose at a minimum a requirement that the exec-
utive have a reasonable basis for its conclusions, even if the 
facts underlying those conclusions are themselves not wholly 
subject to scrutiny.290 In such cases, reasonableness could be 
tested against an objective measure of accuracy, but it could al-
so be based on an evaluation of process indicators demonstrat-
ing that the executive’s findings were based on adequate inter-
nal assessments.291 To the extent information publicly available 
would tend to undermine the executive’s position on the factual 
existence of armed conflict, it may be appropriate to place the 
burden on the executive to come forward with reasons, even if 
necessarily subject to in camera review, why that information 
is not dispositive. Interests in effectiveness may require the 
protection of secrecy surrounding such operations, and in this 
respect may favor deference to the executive to an extent. But 
as the Baker Court recognized, “a Court is not at liberty to shut 
its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law de-
pends upon the truth of what is declared. . . . [It can] inquire 
whether the exigency still existed upon which the continued 
operation of the law depended.”292 Once a political judgment is 
made to stop shooting, it must be within the power of the courts 
 
force. 
 290. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–35 (2007); Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 291. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 269, at 1392–94; Pearlstein, supra note 
24, at 1620–22.  
 292. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547–48 (1924)); Ex parte Milli-
gan, 71 U.S. 2, 126–27 (1866) (rejecting the government’s argument that Indi-
ana was a theater of war).  
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to determine under the objective standard given by law—
whatever the government subsequently says—that hostilities 
have come to an end. 
  CONCLUSION   
For much of the past decade, it has been difficult to over-
state the depth of the public and scholarly consensus that ex-
isted around the view that when Congress authorized the use of 
armed force against “those nations, organizations, or persons 
[the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided” the attacks of September 11, the “war” thus undertaken 
was one without identifiable limits in time.293 That is, the view 
has been that not only would it be impossible in advance to 
identify when the use of armed force would cease—it has of 
course never been possible at war’s beginning to identify on 
which definite date war will end—but there would be no set of 
events, circumstances, or conditions that could be imagined, 
the occurrence of which might bring about a recognition of the 
political, or in any objective way factual, end of the war. That 
consensus no longer exists. Indeed, as the United States pre-
pares to conclude combat operations in Afghanistan,294 and as 
executive branch officials contemplate the likelihood of core Al 
Qaeda’s “strategic defeat,”295 courts are already beginning to 
contend with the legal complexity of when that war began and 
when it should be understood to end.  
Given the legal significance of the question across a range 
of present authorities, it is important to recognize both the long 
history of courts’ engagement in such questions, and to identify 
what factors are relevant in informing their answer here. More, 
as concepts of war and national security expand, and as bound-
aries between affairs that are purely “foreign” and those exclu-
sively “domestic” collapse, it is essential to revisit old assump-
tions about the role of the courts in this vast field of 
government activity. Deference to the judgment of other 
 
 293. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 11, at 53 (“Just what will mark the con-
clusion of hostilities? . . . [T]here do not appear to be clearly identifiable objec-
tives that allow for the successful completion of the conflict. There is no physi-
cal territory to conquer, no clear leadership structure to topple, no Reichstag 
over which to fly a foreign flag.”); see also Bellinger & Padmanabhan, supra 
note 200, at 229 (citing, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism 
Threats and the Laws of War, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 429, 435–36 
(2010)). 
 294. See¸e.g., supra note 8 (quoting Obama speeches).  
 295. See supra note 9 (quoting officials).  
PEARLSTEIN_4fmt 11/6/2014 4:13 PM 
220 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:143 
 
branches in matters of interpretation has always challenged 
constitutional concepts of judicial independence. But uncritical 
deference serves no constitutional end—even at the threshold 
of war. 
